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Booker Disparity and Data-Driven Sentencing
JOSHUA M. DIVINE*
Sentencing disparity among similar offenders has increased at a disconcerting rate
over the last decade. Some judges issue sentences twice as harsh as other judges on
the same court, so a defendant’s sentence often depends substantially on which judge
is randomly assigned to the defendant’s case. The old mandatory sentencing
guidelines repressed disparity but only by causing unwarranted uniformity. The
advisory guidelines swing the pendulum toward the opposite extreme, and this
problem promises to grow worse as the lingering effects of the old regime diminish.
This Article proposes a systemdata-driven appellate reviewto curb sentencing
disparity without re-introducing unwarranted uniformity. In a system where
sentencing judges possess significant discretion, only meaningful appellate review
can restrain the tendency for sentencing practices to deviate substantially between
judges. Discretionary sentencing decisions are currently reviewed for abuse of
discretion, which leads some judges to issue much harsher or much more lenient
sentences than other judges. Congress can mitigate this problem of inter-judge
disparity by changing the standard of review, creating a rebuttable presumption that
outlier sentences among similar offenders are unreasonable. The data the U.S.
Sentencing Commission collects on over 70,000 criminal cases annually can be used
to define categories of similar offenders. Culling outlier sentences through datadriven appellate review would increase judicial awareness of sentences issued by peer
judges, restricting inter-judge disparity without incurring unwarranted uniformity.

* Deputy Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General of Missouri. Yale Law School, J.D.
2016. All views are my own. I am grateful to members of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, the Hon.
William Pryor and Professor Rachel Barkow, as well as Professors Kate Stith, Daniel Kelly, Marah
McLeod, Derek Muller, and Mark Osler for their insightful comments on earlier drafts or
conversations about this project.
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INTRODUCTION
Federal sentencing policy leaves a substantial portion of each
sentence subject to the identity of the sentencing judge. A card randomly
drawn from a shuffled decka method some courts have used to assign
judges to cases1can alter the length of a sentence by several years.
Between 2007 and 2011, one judge in the District of Nebraska sentenced
drug offenders to a median 60 months while a colleague on the same
court sentenced drug offenders to a median twice that amount.2 This
inter-judge disparity has swelled since the Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Booker3 rendered the sentencing guidelines advisory,
and the disparity shows signs of only increasing.
Booker nullified an important part of the Sentencing Reform Act,
which had created the Sentencing Commission and clothed the
Commission with authority to create the mandatory Sentencing
Guidelines. Reducing inter-judge disparity was a central aimif not the
central aim4of the Act.5 Congress sought to achieve this aim by
pursuing an ideal of uniformity that required judges to sentence
defendants within complicated and narrow guideline ranges that judges
were to calculate based on facts they found.6 The Act had no shortage of
faults,7 and it reduced inter-judge disparity at the cost of increasing
unwarranted uniformity,8 but it successfully reduced inter-judge
disparity in measurable ways through the mandatory guidelines.9

1. E.g., D. MINN. ORDER FOR ASSIGNMENT OF CASES 7 (Dec. 1, 2008).
2. Richard G. Kopf, Judge-Specific Sentencing Data for the District of Nebraska, 25 FED. SENT’G
REP. 50, 51 tbl. 7 (2012). One of these judges was a senior judge and may not have had a random
sampling of cases, but the average difference between active judges was still twenty-two percent in
drug cases. Id.
3. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
4. KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS 104 (1998); Ryan W. Scott, Booker’s Ironies, 47 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 695, 714 (2016) (“Among
Congress’s primary objectives . . . was the reduction of inter-judge disparity . . . .”). Certainly
“[e]liminating unwarranted sentencing disparity was the primary goal of the Sentencing Reform Act,”
even if eliminating inter-judge disparity, in particular, was not. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN
YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING 79 (2004).
5. Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV.
1, 3 (2010) (noting that the Sentencing Reform Act was intended to drive away sentencing disparity
created by “the philosophy, politics, or biases of the sentencing judge”).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2012).
7. See, e.g., STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 51–60, 68, 82, 94, 98, 115.
8. Paul J. Hofer, Data, Disparity, and Sentencing Debates: Lessons from the TRAC Report on
Inter-Judge Disparity, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 37, 40 (2012) (noting that Guidelines departures are
sometimes necessary to prevent disparity).
9. FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 97-99 (“The federal sentencing
guidelines have made significant progress toward reducing disparity caused by judicial discretion.”);
James M. Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 294 (1999) (finding evidence that interjudge disparity fell
thirty-six percent in a six-year span following the Sentencing Reform Act). But see U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, supra note 4, at 98 (showing that judicial disparity increased for robbery and immigration
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In a post-Booker world where pre-defined guideline ranges are
advisory only, the Act has lost the element most responsible for reducing
inter-judge disparity, and nothing remotely sufficient has replaced that
element. Instead, “copious evidence” now shows that Booker decimated
the central purpose of the Act.10 To be sure, Booker is responsible for only
a slight decrease in aggregate sentence averages (although average drug
sentences decreased substantially).11 But Booker instigated significant
disparity between the individual sentences that make up those aggregate
averages when Booker augmented judicial discretion and reduced
meaningful appellate review.12 Booker has at least doubled how
important a specific judge is to the outcome of a sentence in certain
districts, and the effect is even greater after controlling for mandatory
minimum sentences because those sentences create an artificial
uniformity that masks variation.13 The example from the District of
Nebraska also understates the extent of inter-judge disparity because
judges in that district adhere to the recommendations of the advisory
guidelines at higher rates than average, so offenders in that district
experience below-average disparity.14 This disparity is driven not only
from differences in judicial philosophy, but also from the basic lack of
awareness many judges have of sentences their peer judgesthat is,
other judges on the same courtimpose, which in turn makes many
judges unaware of their own harsh or lenient tendencies.15
This problem is likely to intensify. Although many judges continue
to issue sentences within calculated ranges established by the advisory
guidelines, that practice is attributable in part to the inertia of judges who
grew used to sentencing when those ranges were mandatory and have not
deviated much from their original practices. One should not expect newly
appointed judges to exhibit the same tendency.16
What is to be done about a system that does not achieve its central
aim of reducing arbitrary disparities between offenders? No shortage of

offenses); STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 106 (arguing that inter-judge disparity was exaggerated
before the Sentencing Reform Act).
10. Frank O. Bowman, III, Dead Law Walking: The Surprising Tenacity of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1227, 1266 (2014).
11. Jeffery Ulmer & Michael T. Light, Beyond Disparity: Changes in Federal Sentencing After
Booker and Gall, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 333, 335 (2011); Frank O. Bowman, III, Prolegomenon on the
Status of the Hopey, Changey Thing in American Criminal Justice, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 93, 94 (2010)
(reporting that within-range sentences dropped from 70.9 % before Booker to 54.8 % in fiscal year 2010).
12. Bowman, III, supra note 10, at 1261, 1266–67.
13. Scott, supra note 5, at 5, 33 (reporting, among other things, that several judges in the
post-Booker period depart three times as often as other judges).
14. Kopf, supra note 2, at 51.
15. Kopf, supra note 2, at 51.
16. See Nancy Gertner, Supporting Advisory Guidelines, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 270 (2009)
(identifying adherence to the Guidelines post-Booker as the result of “habits ingrained during twenty
years of mandatory Guideline sentencing”).

DIVINE-69.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

April 2018]

4/6/2018 4:00 PM

BOOKER DISPARITY AND DATA-DRIVEN SENTENCING

775

scholars have suggested abolishing and replacing the Guidelines.17 Yet
the majority of judges favor the Guidelines in their advisory state.18
Judges tend to appreciate the Guidelines and find them helpful;19
presumably, they disfavor revolutionary departures from the current
system. Moreover, the existing proposals seek other goals, not a
reduction in inter-judge disparity. This Article contributes to the
literature by providing the first reform tailored specifically toward
attacking inter-judge disparity in the post-Booker world. It does so by
supplementing the current system instead of replacing it and by delving
deeply into the sentencing data the Commission collects to demonstrate
how that data can be used to craft a remedy for inter-judge disparity.
In particular, this Article establishes that direct methods of
attacking inter-judge disparity invariably produce unwarranted
uniformity, which creates its own inequities. This was the approach taken
by the mandatory guidelines. A more indirect approach that focuses on
discrete, specific instances of inter-judge disparity should be tried
instead.20 Federal appeals courts currently review sentences under a
highly deferential, abuse-of-discretion standard. Congress should alter
this standard by creating a presumption for federal appellate courts that
a sentence is unreasonable if it deviates too much from what similarly
situated offenders have received. Creating that presumption would (1)
induce sentencing judges to provide greater justifications for their
sentences in an attempt to overcome a presumption of unreasonableness
and (2) make sentencing judges more aware of the sentences imposed by
other judges on their courts, an awareness that is currently lacking.21
These two predominant effects would ameliorate system-wide
inter-judge disparity.
Because this reform depends on measuring the distance a sentence
deviates from those sentences typically issued to similarly situated
offenders, this reform can work only if a feasible method exists for
defining categories of similarly situated offenders. Fortunately, those
categories can readily be defined by using the voluminous sentencing

17. E.g., William K. Sessions III, At the Crossroads of the Three Branches: The U.S. Sentencing
Commission’s Attempts to Achieve Sentencing Reform in the Midst of Inter-Branch Power Struggles,
26 J.L. & POL. 305, 309 (2011) (arguing that Congress should reformulate and simplify the sentencing
guidelines).
18. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES JANUARY
2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 tbl.19 (2010), http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-publications/
research-projects-and-surveys (reporting that more than three-quarters of judges believe the advisory
system “‘best achieves’ the sentencing goals outlined in the U.S. Code, 18 U.S.C. § 3553, and only three
percent of judges believe the mandatory Guidelines were better.”).
19. Alexander Bunin, Reducing Sentencing Disparity by Increasing Judicial Discretion, 22 FED.
SENT’G REP. 81, 82 (2009).
20. For reasons explained below, this reform is best initiated through Congress, not courts.
21. Kopf, supra note 2, at 50.
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data the U.S. Sentencing Commission already collects and publishes.22
This data, combined with modern technology, permits this proposal to
move forward in a way unfathomable when Congress passed the
Sentencing Reform Act in 1984. Through computers and sentencing data,
courts can readily construct categories of similarly situated offenders and
calculate the ranges of sentences issued in each of those categories.
Other articles have correctly identified the main problem in the
post-Booker worlda lack of meaningful appellate reviewbut none has
constructed the contours of an appellate solution or established why an
appellate solution is feasible. This proposal fills that gap, and this Article
also defends the constitutionality of increasing appellate review. Booker
struck down stronger appellate review when Booker rendered the
Guidelines advisory,23 and several scholars believe that increasing
appellate review might unconstitutionally violate the remedial holding of
Booker.24 This Article explains why changing appellate review is feasible
and constitutional. Finally, the literature has not yet addressed
inter-judge disparity that occurs within guideline ranges. Within-range
sentences occur overwhelmingly at the bottom of each range96.6% of
judges sentenced at the bottom of the range in the pre-Booker
erameaning that a judge who deviates from the norm operates as a
significant source of inter-judge disparity.25

22. 28 U.S.C. § 994(w) (2012).
23. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005).
24. E.g., Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1721–29, 1731–36
(2012) (arguing that there are constitutional issues with Congress legislatively creating a presumption
of reasonableness); Carissa Byrne Hessick, A Critical View of the Sentencing Commission’s Recent
Recommendations to Strengthen the Guidelines System, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1335, 1359 (2014)
(explaining Booker as striking a balance between district court discretion and fealty to the Guidelines,
which creates “a real possibility that the Court might determine that [appellate review] proposals, if
adopted, alter the Booker remedy to such an extent that it no longer fixes the Sixth Amendment
problem”).
25. Of 911 judges who sentenced at least 10 defendants between 1999 and 2001, sentencing at the
bottom of the guideline range was the standard practice for the vast majority of judges, 880 of them.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 4, at 109.
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Figure 1: Sentences for Certain Drug Convictions, D. Neb.
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Figure 126 shows the distribution of sentences issued to defendants
in the District of Nebraska who bear the same major offender
characteristics: statutory sentencing guideline, guideline range (seventy
to eighty-seven months), criminal history, acceptance of responsibility,
and whether a defendant was subject to and sentenced to a mandatory
minimum.27 This figure shows the dominant practice of sentencing
offenders toward the bottom of a guideline range (seventy months in this
example). The literature has failed to ask whether the offender who was
sentenced to eighty-four months experienced inter-judge disparity
despite being sentenced within the guideline range. This Article creates a
system of appellate review that can readily address that question.
In Part I, this Article describes the genesis of the Guidelines. It
briefly explains Booker and the Supreme Court’s relevant subsequent
decisions before exploring the studies that show a substantial increase in
post-Booker inter-judge disparity. In Part II, this Article explains the
proposal in more detail and suggests a statutory change that would lend
effect to the proposal. In Part III, this Article discusses both the expected
results of this reform on inter-judge disparity and the limits of the
proposal. In doing so, it contrasts this proposal with others and shows
that this reform is more capable of reducing inter-judge disparity.
26. To reduce the complexity of the horizontal axis, this Article classifies the data into fewer
variables. The bin labeled “70,” for example, represents all defendants who received sentences greater
than sixty-eight months and less than or equal to seventy months. All defendants listed here received
seventy-month sentences.
27. Because the Guidelines instruct judges to disregard mandatory minimums where an offender
has substantially assisted the prosecution or is eligible for a safety valve, this Article analyzes all
offenders together who were not issued a mandatory minimum.
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Additionally, this Article undertakes the critical task of showing that the
reform is constitutional (because the reform operates outside the
structure of the Guidelines) and that other reforms may not be.
Part IV explains the methodology for how the data the Commission
collects can be used (1) to create categories of similarly situated offenders
and (2) to discern what sentences were issued to those offenders. This
proposal can work only under a relatively simple formula for defining
categories rather than the more complicated formula another author has
proposed for a different but related purpose.28 Part V establishes how this
method of selecting similarly situated offenders works and provides
several examples that display the distribution of sentences among
different offenders.
I. CURRENT STATE OF SENTENCING
A proper understanding of current sentencing policy is incomplete
without a general understanding of its historical developments.29
A. BOOKER’S HISTORY
1. Booker’s Genesis
In early colonial history, juries ordinarily made sentencing
decisions, in part because penitentiaries were not yet common. Without
prisons, convictions were usually linked with one specific sentence—
often death—so no rigorous sentencing mechanism was needed.30 Once
penitentiaries became more common, federal law frequently provided
fixed statutory sentences31 but also defined open ranges in which judges
could sentence.32 The pre-defined ranges were indeterminatethat is,
judges had full discretion to sentence within each rangeand federal law
provided for virtually no appellate review, which was unusual among
common law countries.33 The lack of appellate review made developing
federal common law on sentencing issues almost impossible.34
In the twentieth century, sentencing philosophy changed and
altered with it the structure of sentencing policy. Early sentencing
philosophy was largely retributive.35 By the middle of the twentieth
28. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
29. For an extended analysis of this history, see STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 9–77; Nancy
Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much Law, or Just Right, 100
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 692–97 (2010).
30. Gertner, supra note 29, at 694.
31. Note, The Admissibility of Character Evidence in Determining Sentence, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 715
(1942).
32. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000).
33. Gertner, supra note 29, at 695–96.
34. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 23.
35. Gertner, supra note 29, at 694.
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century, rehabilitative philosophies dominated. Necessary to those
philosophies was broad discretion for judges.36 But rehabilitation soon
gave way to rationalism and scientific rigor.37 The ideal of uniformity
arrived,38 and with it judicial discretion became less necessary.39 A
system based on rehabilitation required the careful judgment of judicial
actors. In contrast, a scientifically rigorous algorithmic system was
naturally more retributive and made Congress and the public the
experts.40
One example that exhibits the newer paradigm of scientific rigor is
the American Law Institute’s attempt to “rationaliz[e] reforms in the area
of crime definition” by instituting the Model Penal Code.41 At the time,
the Supreme Court was busy fundamentally reshaping criminal
procedure but was doing so only at the adjudication stage, leaving
sentencing largely untouched.42 The Model Penal Code made sentencing
appear anti-scientific and non-rigorous in comparison43 and invited
criticisms against the sentencing system, which many viewed as
dependent on the whims of judges and parole authorities.44
During the push for the Sentencing Reform Act, scholars argued that
sentence variation was partly explained by the temperaments of
individual judges and sensitive defendant characteristics, such as race,
education, and class.45 This culminated into a virtual crisis when Marvin
Frankel, then a judge on the Southern District of New York and the
“father of sentencing reform,”46 created a questionnaire of hypothetical
cases. The questionnaire was mailed to federal judges in the Second
Circuit. The results evinced a “glaring disparity” in sentencing practices
on identical cases.47 In eighty percent of the hypothetical cases, judges

36. United States v. Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79, 83 (D. Mass. 2004) (Gertner, J.) (describing
historical sentencing practices and declaring the judge’s role in rehabilitative sentencing as “almost
like a doctor or social worker exercising clinical judgment”).
37. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 11–13, 23.
38. Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. L.
REV. 749, 751 (2006).
39. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 28–30.
40. Gertner, supra note 29, at 691.
41. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 29–30.
42. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949) (rejecting the argument that a judge’s
consideration of a pre-sentence report, consisting of information provided by witnesses not available
for cross-examination, violated the defendant’s due process rights).
43. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 29–30.
44. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 21; see also MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES:
LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1973); Anderson, supra note 9, at 274 (regarding disparity as “that variation
caused by the identity” of specific judges). See generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1976) (arguing that the greatest and most frequent injustice
regarding sentencing occurs when judges are afforded broad discretion).
45. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 31.
46. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 35.
47. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 31.
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disagreed on whether incarceration was even appropriate; in one
hypothetical extortion case, the most lenient judge would have applied
only a three-year sentence compared to the twenty-year sentence a
harsher judge would have applied.48
The desire to rationalize sentencing and make it scientifically
rigorous finally led to the Sentencing Reform Act.49 Only a single voter in
the Senate rejected the bill.50 But by that time, the Act had morphed into
a tool bent on creating utopia. Senator Ted Kennedy, one of the principle
architects, had first tried to create advisory Guidelines,51 but the Act as
passed instead sought to reduce inter-judge disparity through brute force
by (1) limiting judges to sentences within the calculated guideline range
for each specific offender and (2) granting appellate courts broad
appellate review.52 A sentence outside the calculated guideline range was
to be reversed except under a few situations where departure was
authorized.53 Congress further ramped up enforcement of the Guidelines
in 2003in apparent reaction to higher-than-acceptable departure
ratesby creating de novo appellate review for certain circumstances.54
Originally intended to apply to all unenumerated downward
departures,55 the 2003 statute ultimately made departing harder only in
crimes involving pornography, sexual abuse, sexual activity with minors,
and child kidnapping and trafficking.56 The Act turned a process that had
been intended to be more acceptable to offenders into one designed to
discourage crime and encourage cooperation between defendants and
prosecutors in the name of uniformity.57 This model, centered on an ideal
of uniformity, was largely rejected by the states.58

48. ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, FED. JUD. CTR., THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT 6–7 (1974).
49. See O’Hear, supra note 38, at 751 (“[C]ritics argued in the 1970s that rehabilitation was an
uncertain concept that might be misused as cover for irrational and inhumane practices.”).
50. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 43.
51. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 41 n.21.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (2012).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(2) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (permitting departure if the court finds that
there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance “of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in
a sentence different from that described”).
54. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21 § 401(d)(2), 117 Stat. 650, 667–68 (2003) (amending
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) to grant appellate courts de novo review over “the district court’s application of the
guidelines to the facts”).
55. H. Amend. 19 to H.R. 1104, 108th Cong. (2003) (Rep. Feeney).
56. PROTECT Act § 401(a), (b) (permitting only those departures listed in United States
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H, not those departures recognized solely in United States
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K).
57. O’Hear, supra note 38, at 816.
58. O’Hear, supra note 38, at 816.
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The Act created the Sentencing Commission59 and required it to
draft a comprehensive, binding60 sentencing code that controlled
essentially all significant sentencing decisions.61 Congress directed the
Commission to create a rigorous and comprehensive system that would
“reflect every important factor relevant to sentencing for each category of
offense and each category of offender, give appropriate weight to each
factor, and deal with various combinations of factors.”62 In addition to
the comprehensive system of sentencing, the Commission included
“commentaries” and “policy statements” that delineated the purpose of
the Guidelines. The Court later interpreted these statements to be as
authoritative as the Guidelines themselves.63
The desire to introduce scientific rigor into sentencing certainly
found its imprint on the Act. As written, the Act requires judges to follow
a lengthy process of discerning (by a preponderance of the evidence)
whether any number of voluminous adjustments applies to an offender.64
A judge first determines which Guidelines category covers the offender
before applying numerous “specific offense characteristics” to calculate a
“base offense level” score.65 This process “reflects the Commission’s
determination to minimize the need for sentencing judges to exercise
their judgment.”66 The task is frequently difficult. Categories often
cross-reference each other,67 and a judge may have to compute multiple
calculations. After the base offense level is determined, the judge adjusts
the level based on enhancements that exist for an offender’s role in the
crime, the vulnerability of the victim, etc. The judge then calculates the
offender’s criminal history.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2012). Initially, only one member of the Commission had ever been
involved in sentencing. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 49.
60. Judges were prohibited from departing from the calculated guideline ranges except in rare,
exceptional circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2012) (excised in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 220 (2005)); United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1; id. at § 5K2.0.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2012). The Act also abolished parole. Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The
Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 226–42 (1993) (examining the abolition of parole and the many
proposed, but never enacted, statutory provisions that would have kept some indeterminate parole).
Parole had been in place at least since 1910. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, 36 Stat. 819, 819.
62. S. REP. NO. 225, 98-225, at 166 (1983).
63. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 41–47 (1993) (holding commentary statements to be
authoritative); Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 201 (1992) (holding policy statements to be
authoritative).
64. Among many others, these include whether a gun was possessed or fired, the amount of fiscal
loss, the quantity of drugs, whether a burgled building was a residence, and whether any bodily injury
occurred. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).
65. Id. at ch. 2, introductory cmt.
66. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 68.
67. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL § 1B1.5 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015); e.g., id.
§ 2K2.1 (felon-in-possession of firearms guideline, instructing the judge to apply section 2X1.1which
covers attempts, solicitations, and conspiraciesif the possession was in connection with another
offense and the resulting sentence is greater).
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The judge then locates the intersection of the criminal history and
offense level scores on the Commission’s matrix chart. Each intersection
yields a narrow range, and the top of the range generally cannot exceed
the bottom by more than twenty-five percent.68 Still not yet finished, the
judge then takes into account several dozen Guidelines policy
prescriptions that dictate whether the judge can depart from the
calculated guideline range in narrow circumstances.69
2. Booker and Its Progeny
This rigorous and binding system survived for eighteen years until
United States v. Booker made the Guidelines effectively advisory.
Decided at the apotheosis of the efforts by the Rehnquist Court to
establish itself as “one of the most vigorous protectors of the jury
guarantee in Supreme Court history,”70 the Court reasoned that a Sixth
Amendment violation occurs when a maximum sentence is increased
based on facts proved only by preponderance to a judge instead of beyond
a reasonable doubt to a jury.71 The Court also held later that elements
that increase the minimum sentence a court can impose must also be
proved before a jury.72
In fashioning a remedy, the Court could have simply required
prosecutors to present those elements to a jury.73 Instead, the Court, in
an attempt to divine Congressional intent, excised two provisions from
the Act.74 The first had required de novo review. The Court found that the
Act, in the light of the Court’s constitutional holding, implied a substitute
standard of “reasonableness” review.75 The second provision had made
the Guidelines mandatory. Excising that provision the Court “ma[de] the
Guidelines effectively advisory,”76 requiring judges to both consider
whether a sentence was reasonable in the light of the statutory factors
Congress had identified as relevant to sentencing and to calculate and

68. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2012); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, 2 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).
69. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, 6–7 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).
70. Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics, and Criminal Law on the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1043, 1044 (2006).
71. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 232 (2005). Because the Guidelines were mandatory
before Booker, the district court was statutorily limited to imposing a sentence within the 210-262
month calculated range based on what the jury had found (minus certain statutory exceptions not
applicable). Id. at 227. But the district court exercised judicial fact-finding to increase the offender’s
sentencing range to 360 months to life. Id.
72. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2162–63 (2013).
73. See, e.g., Booker, 543 U.S. at 325 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part).
74. Id. at 227, 246 (“We seek to determine what ‘Congress would have intended’ in light of the
Court’s constitutional holding”).
75. Id. at 261.
76. Id. at 245.

DIVINE-69.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

April 2018]

4/6/2018 4:00 PM

BOOKER DISPARITY AND DATA-DRIVEN SENTENCING

783

consider the Guidelines before sentencing a defendant.77 Calculating the
Guidelines is important because “in the ordinary case, the Commission’s
recommendation of a sentencing range will ‘reflect a rough
approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.’”78
Booker quickly became a subject of both scholarly and judicial
interest. One of the most cited Supreme Court cases,79 Booker also
spawned a lengthy doctrine.80 Most importantly, the Court expounded
on its promulgation of reasonableness review shortly after Booker.81 The
Court highlighted the close relationship between the Guidelines and the
§ 3553(a) statutory sentencing factors. Section 3553(a) outlines a list of
77. Id. (invoking 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
78. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.
338, 350 (2007)).
79. Courts have cited Booker more than 30,000 times compared to the just over 15,000 citations
to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) according to citations
recognized in the Westlaw database as of November 2017 (last visited Mar. 3, 2018).
80. As of 2017, the Court has heard a number of cases expanding on or related to Booker. Beckles
v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 894 (2017) (holding that the Guidelines are not subject to challenges
under the void-for-vagueness doctrine because “they merely guide the exercise of a court’s
discretion”); Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1348–49 (2016) (holding that a
defendant need not establish that unpreserved error affected the defendant’s substantial rights);
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2162–63 (2013) (holding that any fact increasing the
mandatory minimum is an “element” required to be submitted to a jury); Peugh v. United States, 133
S. Ct. 2072, 2081, 2088 (2013) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits sentencing offenders
under Guidelines promulgated after an offender has committed a crime when the newer Guidelines
provides a higher sentencing range, despite the Guidelines being advisory); S. Union Co. v. United
States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2350, 2357 (2012) (applying Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000),
the Apprendi rule, to courts issuing criminal fines); Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 504–05
(2011) (permitting district courts to consider post-sentencing rehabilitation during re-sentencing after
an offender’s sentence has been vacated); United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 224, 235
(2010) (requiring the status of a firearm as a machinegun to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to
a jury, not to be included as a sentencing factor to be proved to a judge); Dillon v. United States, 560
U.S. 817, 819, 828–30 (2010) (holding that the Guidelines are mandatory under an 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) resentencing proceeding when the Guidelines have been altered in favor of the
offender); Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 262, 265–66 (2009) (“clarify[ing] that district courts
are entitled to reject and vary categorically from the crack cocaine Guidelines based on a policy
disagreement” alone after Kimbrough); Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 168 (2009) (permitting states to
assign to judges finding of facts regarding whether a consecutive sentence for multiple offenses should
be imposed); Moore v. United States, 555 U.S. 1, 3–4 (2008) (vacating a sentence where the judge
believed the judge had no discretion to reject the crack-powder ratio); Greenlaw v. United States, 554
U.S. 237, 243–44 (2008) (prohibiting courts of appeals from increasing an offender’s sentence absent
a federal government appeal or cross-appeal); Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 712–13, 716
(2008) (holding that FED R. CRIM. P. 32(h), requiring notice when a court is considering a
non-Guidelines sentence, does not apply for a regular sentence variance from the recommended
guideline range); Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 91 (permitting courts to depart from the Guidelines’ 100-to1 crack-powder ratio disparity); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007) (requiring courts of
appeals to review all federal criminal sentences under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 341 (2007) (permitting courts of appeals to apply a
presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence within the recommended guideline
range); Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 275 (2007) (striking down California’s
determinate sentencing law as violating Booker).
81. See, e.g., Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 91; Gall, 552 U.S. at 41; Rita, 551 U.S. at 341.
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“Factors to be Considered [by a District Court Judge] in Imposing a
Sentence” and includes, for example, considering what sentence is
needed “to afford adequate deterrence” and “to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar conduct.”82 The Court held that appellate
courts may adopt a rebuttable presumption that within-Guidelines
sentences are reasonable.83 The whole purpose of the Guidelines was to
“seek to embody the § 3553(a) considerations.”84 As such, the guideline
ranges “reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve
§ 3553(a)’s objectives.”85 A presumption of reasonableness recognizes
that both the Commission and the district court have arrived at the same
conclusion.86
Although district courts cannot presume sentences to be reasonable,
the Court said that within-range sentences ordinarily need no
explanation other than a statement that the court is following the
Guidelines rationale but that greater explanations are often necessary the
further a sentence deviates from the calculated range.87 (This statement
ignored the potential problem of inter-judge disparity within a guideline
range.) Yet the Court later prohibited any type of “rigid mathematical
formula” from determining the strength of the justification that should
be required for departures.88 Using a mathematical formula would “come
too close to creating an impermissible presumption of unreasonableness”
for non-Guidelines sentences.89 The worry appears to be that a
presumption of unreasonableness could reintroduce the Sixth
Amendment problem by making the Guidelines effectively mandatory.90
The Court explicitly declared that a heightened appellate standard “is
inconsistent with” Booker’s abuse of discretion standard,91 although
courts can “consider the extent of a deviation from the Guidelines” when
determining whether a sentence is reasonable.92
Not yet done with disarming appellate review after Booker, the
Court showed just how broad district court discretion is when it decided
Kimbrough v. United States. There, the Court permitted district court
82. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), (a)(2)(B), (a)(6) (2012).
83. Rita, 551 U.S. at 347.
84. Id. at 350.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 347.
87. Id. at 356–57.
88. Gall v. United States, 551 U.S. 38, 47 (2007).
89. Id.
90. Brief for United States at 34–35, Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (No. 06-5754)
(implying that a presumption of unreasonableness might be problematic because it might “transform
an ‘effectively advisory’ system . . . into an effectively mandatory one” (quoting United States v.
Moreland, 437 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 2006)).)
91. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49.
92. Id. at 50.
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judges to vary downward based solely on a policy disagreement the
district court judge had with the 100-to-1 crack-powder ratio outlined in
the Guidelines.93 The Court extended this holding in Spears v. United
States, when it affirmed a district court’s decision not only to disagree
with the Guidelines ratio but to create its own.94
B. BOOKER’S PROBLEMS
The return of judicial discretion established by Booker has generally
been welcomed95 (although more than a few find the case
objectionable96). The mandatory system was too constraining in its
utopian pursuit of an algorithm that could be used to sentence unique
offenders. It had reacted to the tendency the indeterminate sentencing
framework had of focusing “too much on individualization and not
enough on avoiding unjust disparities.”97 But it weighed too heavily drug
quantities and how much financial loss a crime involved and left little
room for judges to provide feedback to the Commission through their
sentencing.98
But in bringing back wide judicial discretion, the Court also
destroyed any sense of meaningful appellate review. Not only is the
reasonableness review of Booker a highly unusual standard for reviewing
district court decisions,99 but the Court promoted judicial discretion by
removing the central functions of ordinary appellate review. For
instance, the presumption of reasonableness in Rita v. United States
diverges from ordinary standards of review because it is an optional
presumption that appellate courts may make, and Kimbrough, by
requiring reasonableness review for policy disagreements with the
Guidelines, departs from the ordinary norm that legal determinations of
district courts are reviewed de novo.100 The Court has essentially created
a safe harbor for within-range sentences, Rita; has prohibited courts
from rigorously defining proportional justification requirements for
departures, Gall v. United States; and has permitted virtually limitless
discretion based solely on judicial philosophy, Kimbrough/Spears.

93. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109–10 (2007).
94. Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 267 (2009).
95. E.g., Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 24, at 1632–33.
96. E.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, Nothing Is Not Enough: Fix the Absurd Post-Booker Federal
Sentencing System, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 356, 356 (2012) (criticizing the post-Booker system as
“retain[ing] most of the flaws of the system it replaced, while adding new ones”).
97. Rachel E. Barkow, Sentencing Guidelines at the Crossroads of Politics and Expertise, 160
U. PENN. L. REV. 1599, 1619 (2012).
98. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 24, at 1675, 1706–07.
99. Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Decisions,
60 ALA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2008).
100. Id. at 19, 25.
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This last point is especially important. Although the Kimbrough
Court placed heavy emphasis on facts that were particular to
Kimbroughthat the crack-powder ratio existed because of
congressional inertia and despite the Commission’s public proclamation
that the ratio should be changed101the Court later emphasized that
sentencing judges are afforded “wide discretion” and may disregard
Guidelines policies in other areas, such as when a judge considers postsentencing rehabilitative conduct during resentencing.102 The Court has
even permitted sentencing courts to not just disregard policy statements,
but to substitute into the Guidelines their own policy statementsat
least with regard to crack-powder ratios103and courts have read this
holding as a grant of authority of vast judicial discretion to disregard
Guidelines policy statements.104 Finally, although Kimbrough hinted
101. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 99, 109 (2007); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY viii (2002) (“[T]he
Commission . . . unanimously and firmly concludes that the various congressional objectives can be
achieved more effectively by decreasing substantially the 100-to-1 drug quantity ratio.”). The
Commission had passed an amendment to equalize the crack/powder penalties, but President Clinton
signed legislation nullifying the amendment. Id. at v.
102. Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 480, 500–01 (2011) (quoting Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)). The Guidelines explicitly prohibited consideration of post-sentencing
rehabilitation during resentencing. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.19 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2010). But the Court declared that sentencing courts must only “give ‘respectful
consideration’” to policy statements, a sharp post-Booker departure from its original holding that such
policy statements were authoritative. Pepper, 562 U.S. at 501 (quoting Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 101);
cf. Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 201 (1992) (holding policy statements to be authoritative).
103. Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 265–66 (2009).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 649 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 2011) (permitting a
downward variance because of a policy disagreement with the child pornography Guidelines); United
States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592, 608–09 (3d Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174,
188 (2d Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568, 584–85 (6th Cir. 2009)
(interpreting Kimbrough as declaring “the broad authority of sentencing judges” to “categorically
reject” a calculated sentencing range); see also Clare Freeman, Spears v. U.S.Getting the Kimbrough
Point Across, SIXTH CIRCUIT BLOG (Jan. 22, 2009, 9:02 AM), http://circuit6.blogspot.com/
2009/01/spears-v-us-getting-kimbrough-point.html. But see United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179,
1201 n.15 (11th Cir. 2008) (rejecting a downward variance for disagreements with the child
pornography Guidelines).
This reading of Kimbrough is internally coherent with Booker’s creation of an advisory system
and is the better reading after Spears and Pepper. Yet one can plausibly read Kimbrough more
narrowly in the light of its emphasis on the history of the crack-powder ratio and the legislative inertia
that had, at the time, prevented the Commission from crafting a new issuing. See Kimbrough v. United
States, 552 U.S. 85, 94–100 (2007). In Pepper, too, the Court permitted disregarding the Guidelines
policy statements in part because the Court found the statement to be “wholly unconvincing.” Pepper,
562 U.S. at 501.
Judge Hardiman, who sits on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, argues that the
Kimbrough line should not be interpreted to allow judges to vary from the Guidelines based on policy
disagreements alone. Hon. Thomas M. Hardiman & Richard L. Heppner Jr., Policy Disagreements
with the United States Sentencing Guidelines: A Welcome Expansion of Judicial Discretion or the
Beginning of the End of the Sentencing Guidelines?, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 5, 32–33 (2012). Hardiman
instead counsels that, before varying, district court judges should consider whether the Guidelines
reflect the Commission acting in its archetypal institutional role and whether the advisory sentencing
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that “closer review” might be appropriate for certain policy
disagreements,105 the Court left open whether closer review is ever
appropriate.106 The weight of the doctrine leaves little to the imagination;
sentencing judges enjoy broad discretion.
Furthermore, reasonableness review nominally permits courts to
vacate sentences as substantively unreasonable, but the extremely
deferential standard of review the Court has promulgated has ensured
that sentences are almost never vacated for this reason.107 Many of the
sentences that are vacated as substantively unreasonable might also be
mislabeled, overstating the actual number. Errors some circuits have
held were substantive errors are considered by other circuits to be
procedural errors.108
What’s more, procedural error review hardly constrains a judge’s
substantive decisions because a judge is largely free to issue to an
offender the same sentence on remand. Procedural reasonableness has
been interpreted to require only that a district judge show that he or she
has correctly calculated the applicable guideline range, has not treated
the Guidelines as mandatory, has considered the § 3553(a) factors, and
has not relied on clearly erroneous facts.109 Yet after calculating a
guideline range, a judge is fully permitted to disregard the Guidelines.
These rules establish a system of wide judicial discretion with
limited appellate oversight, which was the major problem with
range is reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors. Id.
105. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109.
106. Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2080 n.2 (2013).
107. Courts of appeals ordinarily reverse barely one percent of sentences that are challenged as
substantively unreasonable. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS tbl.59 (2012), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/
annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2011/Table59_0.pdf [hereinafter 2011 SOURCEBOOK]; U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.59 (2013),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-source
books/2012/Table59_0.pdf [hereinafter 2012 SOURCEBOOK]; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2013
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.59 (2014), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2013/Table59.pdf.
[hereinafter 2013 SOURCEBOOK]; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2014 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS tbl.59 (2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/
annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/Table59.pdf [hereinafter 2014 SOURCEBOOK].
108. For instance, the Sixth Circuit considers it to be substantively unreasonable when a court
considers impermissible factors. See United States v. Ward, 506 F.3d 468, 478 (6th Cir. 2007). While
Ward has been favorably cited elsewhere, United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1192 (11th Cir. 2008),
impermissible-factors cases are largely relegated to the Sixth Circuit. That is probably because Gall
suggests that considering impermissible factors is procedural error, not substantive error. Gall held
that procedural unreasonableness includes failing to consider each of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.
Gall, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). This holding implies a negative component that the § 3553(a) factors are
exhaustive and that courts should not consider other factors.
The Sixth Circuit also categorizes as substantively unreasonable a court’s failure to adequately
justify a sentence. See United States v. Borho, 485 F.3d 904, 911 (6th Cir. 2007). But Gall explicitly
considers this failure under the umbrella of procedural unreasonableness. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
109. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
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indeterminate sentencing before the Sentencing Reform Act.110 Current
doctrine now resembles a bifurcated system. The Supreme Court,
concerned with the arbitrary imposition of death sentences, has used the
appellate process to create greater safeguards in capital cases, but
concern at the appellate stage with arbitrary results induced by
inter-judge disparity in non-capital cases is lacking.111
This reduction in meaningful appellate review appears to have been
the primary driver of increases in inter-judge disparity. Booker’s return
of judicial discretion certainly had an effect, but the brunt of the increase
did not occur until after Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough.112 The needed
destruction of uniformity, coupled with the decimation of meaningful
appellate review, has created a system in which virtually no parts are
oriented toward reducing inter-judge disparity. The only aspects that do
still limit inter-judge disparity are the anchoring effects of the Guidelines
and judicial inertia.113 After Booker, some feared that judges would issue
radically disparate sentences.114 After all, sentencing lengths
tremendously increased (and non-incarceration rates significantly
decreased) after the Sentencing Reform Act and the Guidelines.115 But the
decrease since Booker, while measurable, has been far from severe. The
mean and median sentences decreased by three to six months and may
be on the rise again.116
110. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 82 (identifying the lack of appellate review as one of the
greatest deficiencies of the indeterminate era).
111. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1148, 1204 (2009) (stating that
non-capital defendants receive “almost no Court oversight of their sentences,” which “languish in a
backwater devoid of any procedural protections”).
112. Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines
Regime? Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268, 1333 (2014).
113. The Court has implicitly recognized this effect. E.g., Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072,
2081, 2088 (2013) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits sentencing offenders under
advisory Guidelines promulgated after an offender has committed a crime when the newer Guidelines
provides a higher sentencing range).
The effect is also well-documented in scholarship. Birte Englich, et al., Playing Dice with
Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts’ Judicial Decision Making,
32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 188, 194 (2006) (suggesting that giving judges starting values,
even ones known to be arbitrary, has a discernible anchoring effect on judicial sentencing); Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124,
1128–30 (1974) (demonstrating this psychological bias in non-judicial realms); see also, e.g., Nancy
Gertner, Thoughts on Reasonableness, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 165, 167 (2007) (recognizing the effect);
Stephanos Bibas et al., Policing Politics at Sentencing, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1371, 1387 (2009) (same);
Michael M. O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentence Explanations: Learning from the Wisconsin and
Federal Experiences, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 758 (2009) (same).
114. Carl Hulse & Adam Liptak, New Fight over Controlling Punishments Is Widely Seen, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at A29 (identifying some commentators as calling Booker an “egregious
overreach” and saying it will lead to “wildly inconsistent” outcomes while others praise the decision
for allowing greater leniency).
115. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 5–6.
116. Bowman, supra note 10, at 1236.
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But even inertia and anchoring effects are unlikely to stem the flow
of inter-judge disparity. The relative stability of sentences is true only in
the aggregate, not across the board. The means and medians are level,
but only because firearm and economic sentences increased significantly
to counter the decrease in drug and immigration sentences.117 And the
aggregate means and medians mask the variation between judges. So,
too, mandatory minimums cloud the data by making median sentences
appear more uniform, disguising the true effect of Booker by mixing into
the same pot sentences where judges are statutorily constrained and
sentences where judges are free to disregard the Guidelines.118 Most
notably, even with a high adherence to the Guidelines, geographic
disparity and inter-judge disparity have increased measurably.119 Quite
apart from the hard data, the anecdotal evidence has been
tremendous.120 Professor Frank Bowman concludes that “uncontrolled
disparity will again become a rallying cry” because inter-judge disparity
“should matter to anyone who believes that one important component of
a just system of criminal punishment is that similarly situated offenders
are treated substantially similarly.”121
Inertia and anchoring effects are also unlikely to stem the tide of
inter-judge disparity because those effects are weaker on new judges.
Immediately after Booker, nearly all judges were used to the mandatory
Guidelines regime andquite apart from the anchoring effect of the
Guidelinesmay have remained relatively inert in their sentencing
practices.122 But by the end of his term, President Obama had appointed
more than one-third of the district court bench.123 To the extent the
inertia hypothesis is correct, inter-judge disparity should increase as

117. Bowman, supra note 10, at 1241.
118. Bowman, supra note 10, at 1257.
119. Bowman, supra note 10, at 1261.
120. Scott, supra note 5, at 3–4.
121. Bowman, supra note 10, at 1267–68.
122. Scott, supra note 5, at 5 (finding two judges in the District of Massachusetts to be relatively
inert in their sentencing practices). However, Scott found that no greater inertia effect occurred for
judges who were appointed after 1987 than those appointed before; both sentenced below the
Guidelines more than thirty percent of the time in the post-Booker era. Scott, supra note 5, at 43–44.
These findings do not necessarily counter the conjecture that newly appointed judges will
abide by the Guidelines less. Scott’s hypothesis is that judges appointed before 1987 “might cast off
the yoke of the Guidelines more readily.” Scott, supra note 5, at 43. But even if a judge had enjoyed
greater sentencing freedom before 1987, by the time Booker was decided, the judge would have been
sentencing under a mandatory regime for nearly two decades. The difference between a pre-1987 judge
and a post-1987 (but pre-Booker) judge is not terribly meaningful. But the difference between a
pre-Booker judge and a post-Booker judge is tremendous. One should not expect a pre-1987 judge to
sentence much differently from a judge appointed in, say, 1999. But one should expect that both will
sentence very differently from a judge who never sentenced under a mandatory regime.
123. Judgeship Appointments by President, U.S. CTS. http://www.uscourts.gov/judgesjudgeships/authorized-judgeships/judgeship-appointments-president (last visited Mar. 3, 2018).
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pre-Booker judges retire and are replaced by post-Booker judges.124 If
one cares about inter-judge disparity, the time for action is yesterday. A
more meaningful form of appellate review is necessary.
C. RECENT STUDIES DEMONSTRATING INTER-JUDGE DISPARITY
Measuring inter-judge disparity has traditionally been notoriously
difficult.125 The Commission gathers a wealth of data, compiling
extensive information for almost all of the 70,000-plus defendants each
year. This data includes the guidelines calculations, statutory offense
category, and as many as thousands of other data points (depending on
how the judge sentences the offender). The problem is the Commission
removes all identifying information before publicly releasing the data,
which makes measuring the differences in sentences by judges more
difficult.126 Even where identifying information is available, studies have
had difficulty controlling for relevant sentencing characteristics.127
Several recent studies have nevertheless overcome these boundaries to
show the increasing significance of inter-judge disparity.
Professor Ryan Scott surveyed the data released by judges in the
Boston division of the District of Massachusetts. The only district at the
time to publicly release its data with judge identifiers,128 the district
opened up a critical insight into a world before unknown. The results are

124. See Gertner, supra note 16, at 270 (identifying adherence to the Guidelines post-Booker as
the result of “habits ingrained during twenty years of mandatory Guideline sentencing”); Yang, supra
note 112, at 1319 (noting that as newer judges take the bench, the Guidelines are likely to have less of
an anchoring effect).
125. Scott, supra note 5, at 21 (noting that “changes are almost impossible to detect”); Caleb Mason
& David Bjerk, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity on the Federal Bench: An Examination of Drug
Smuggling Cases in the Southern District of California, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 190, 190 (2013)
(identifying as “principal shortcomings” of these measurements the difficulty in either identifying
judges or controlling for “relevant offense-conduct facts”).
126. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PUBLIC ACCESS TO SENTENCING COMMISSION DOCUMENTS AND DATA,
54 Fed. Reg. 51279 (Dec. 13, 1989) (delineating an agreement between the Commission and the
Judicial Conference to remove all judge and defendant identifiers from publicly released datafiles);
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDE TO PUBLICATIONS & RESOURCES 2010/2011 28 (2010), (“Pursuant to
the policy on public access to Sentencing Commission documents and data, all case and defendant
identifiers have been removed from the data.” (internal citation omitted)).
127. E.g., Anderson et al., supra note 9, at 274 (employing a methodology that considered “solely
that variation caused by the identity of the decision maker,” as opposed to variation in punishment
among different classes of offenders); Paul J. Hofer et al., The Effect of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239, 282 (1999) (“We
recognize that this measures only the ‘tip of the iceberg’ of disparity created by judges, because it fails
to account for interaction effects between judges and particular offense and offender characteristics.”);
Joel Waldfogel, Aggregate Inter-Judge Disparity in Federal Sentencing: Evidence from Three
Districts (D. Ct., S.D.N.Y., N.D. Cal.), 4 FED. SENT’G REP. 151, 151–52 (1991). But see Mason & Bjerk,
supra note 125, at 191–92 (employing a methodology that allowed the researchers to limit the cases to
offenders who had dealt in drug quantities triggering mandatory minimums but were eligible for the
sentencing safety valve and received reduced sentences).
128. Scott, supra note 5, at 4.
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striking. Limiting his analysis to 10 active-status judges who had
sentenced at least 50 defendants,129 Scott found that the 3 most lenient
judges impose sentences that average 25.5 months or less; the other 2
judges impose sentences that average more than double (51.4 months)
the more lenient judges. Not unsurprisingly, four judges now sentence
below the guideline ranges at more than triple their pre-Booker rates.130
Following the Boston Study, the District of Nebraska voted to release
its sentencing data to the public.131 In Nebraska, sentences are more
likely to be uniform because judges impose within-range sentences at
rates much higher than the national average, yet one judge sentenced
drug offenders at twice the median rate of a second. Although this effect
might be overstated because the stricter judge had sentenced fewer drug
offenders and had greater control over the docket because the judge had
taken senior status, the difference in median rate between the two active
judges with a comparable number of sentences was still twenty-two
percent.132
Researchers in a third study manually collected data by accessing
complaints and dockets in the Southern District of California, allowing
the researchers to identify the judges.133 But rather than look at average
or median sentences, the researchers employed a new methodology. They
recognized that offenders with somewhat disparate drug quantities can
receive the same guideline range calculations. For instance, the drug
quantity table assigns the same offense level to individuals who deal
fifteen kilograms of cocaine as to those who deal forty-nine kilograms of
cocaine,134 yet one would expect judges to sentence the latter somewhat
more heavily. The researchers isolated their data so they were looking at
offenders who differed only in type and quantity of drugs.135 This practice
allowed them to use regression analysis to create an “expected” sentence
for each drug quantity and to measure how far from the expected
sentence each judge deviated.136
The researchers found “substantial disparity.”137 Ten of thirteen
judges had low variance from the expected sentence, but two judges were
noticeably more lenient (sentencing around seventeen to eighteen
129. Scott, supra note 5, at 25.
130. Scott, supra note 5, at 4–5.
131. Kopf, supra note 2, at 50.
132. Kopf, supra note 2, at at 51 app. tbl. 7 (Drug Trafficking (2007–2011)).
133. Mason & Bjerk, supra note 125, at 191.
134. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(4) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
135. The researchers ensured they were measuring similarly situated offenders by limiting their
analysis to individuals who were given sentences below mandatory minimums despite carrying drug
quantities that would trigger a mandatory minimum but for the offenders being eligible for a safety
valve that prevented the mandatory minimum, a benefit available only to offenders with criminal
history scores of one. Mason & Bjerk, supra note 125, at 191.
136. Mason & Bjerk, supra note 125, at 191–92.
137. Mason & Bjerk, supra note 125, at 196.
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percent below the “expected” sentence) and one was noticeably harsher
(sentencing around thirty percent above the “expected sentence”).138
These differences “reflect individual judges’ preferences about the
appropriate sentence for the same crime.”139
Another study launched by the Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse (“TRAC”) program at Syracuse University140 acquired
most of the sentencing data covering a five-year period: roughly 370,000
cases nationwide.141 Because the Sentencing Commission does not
voluntarily release data that identifies judges, TRAC gathered this data
from other sources, such as the Office of Personnel Management142 and,
evidently, PACER.143 Like Scott’s study, TRAC limited its data to judges
who had sentenced at least fifty defendants, and TRAC subdivided the
data into categories of judges who had served continuously during the
five-year post-Booker span and for judges who had continuously served
on active status during that time.144
Although some of the districts maintained low variance, the results
were largely consistent with all other studies. The median sentences of
judges in Dallas, Texas, varied between 60 months and 121.5 months; in
Fort Worth between 102.5 months and 160 months; and in the District
of Columbia between 27 and 77 months.145
The most crucial and developed study comes from Professor Crystal
S. Yang, who built upon the work of the TRAC Report and Scott’s study.
In merging the TRAC Report data with sentencing data the Commission
makes available, Yang identified the sentencing judge for more than
400,000 sentences, eliminating some of the most serious hindrances to
studying inter-judge disparity.146 The most comprehensive study to date,
Yang’s study found that the effect of inter-judge disparity doubled in the
post-Booker period.147
D. LIMITS OF THESE STUDIES
These studies are not without their limits, and each included caveats
about interpreting the findings too broadly.148 But each also shows
138. Mason & Bjerk, supra note 125, at 193, 195.
139. Mason & Bjerk, supra note 125, at 192.
140. Surprising Judge-to-Judge Variations Documented in Federal Sentencing, TRAC REP. (Mar.
5, 2012), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/judge/274.
141. Susan B. Long & David Burnham, TRAC Report: Examining Current Federal Sentencing
Practices: A National Study of Differences Among Judges, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 6, 6 (2012).
142. Id. at 7.
143. Hofer, supra note 8, at 37.
144. Long & Burnham, supra note 141, at 7.
145. Long & Burnham, supra note 141, at 9–10.
146. Yang, supra note 112, at 1275, 1296.
147. Yang, supra note 112, at 1275.
148. E.g., Yang, supra note 112, at 1292 (noting that “a single courthouse is likely unrepresentative
of other courthouses across the United States”); Long & Burnham, supra note 141, at 15 (stating that
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increases in inter-judge disparity, no study has shown an absence of an
increase, and the sources of anecdotal evidence are tremendous.149
The limits do not overcome these findings. The first major limit is
that each of the studies assumes that cases are randomly assigned.
Recent history indicates potentially significant problems (for the
purposes of data collection) in the way cases are assigned.150
Additionally, prosecutors are not necessarily assigned randomly, and
they may tailor their conduct to the judges they draw.
Second, each study limited itself to judges who had sentenced more
than fifty defendants, but only the TRAC study further qualified its data
by sentence type (although it considered forty sentences instead of
fifty).151 On the surface, fifty seems like a reasonable
numberintroductory statistics books often paint thirty as the magic
number152but fifty may be too small if judges received skewed dockets.
For instance, one judge may receive fifty randomly allotted sentencings
that proportionately represent the standard docket of cases while
another judge may receive a thirty-defendant drug trafficking case where
many defendants are subject to mandatory minimums. Yet these
sentencing patterns are most likely rare and would largely affect judges
who had sentenced relatively few offenders. Many of the judges in the
studies sentenced far more than fifty offenders. The Scott study also
ameliorated this difficulty by looking at the difference between the
sentence imposed and the sentence suggested by the calculated
guidelines.153

the large differences in median sentences “is not sufficient to establish that such differences are indeed
unwarranted sentencing disparities”).
149. Scott, supra note 5, at 3–4.
150. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Federal Court Alters Rules on Judge
Assignments, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 23, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/12/24/nyregion/federal-courtalters-rules-on-judge-assignments.html (asserting that the litigation over the stop-and-frisk policy in
New York City has exposed problems in supposed random assignment); Katherine A. Macfarlane, The
Danger of Nonrandom Case Assignment: How the Southern District of New York’s “Related Cases”
Rule Shaped Stop-and-Frisk Rulings, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 199, 203 (2014) (stating that one judge
was randomly assigned a single case and then received all “related” cases); Joe Palazzolo, The Problem
with Not-So-Random Case Assignment, WALL ST. J. (NOV. 4, 2013, 4:44 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/11/04/the-problem-with-not-so-random-case-assignment
(discussing a congressionally authorized pilot program for judges to take related cases from other
judges in the name of judicial efficiency).
151. Long & Burnham, supra note 141, at 9.
152. See, e.g., GREGORY W. CORDER & DALE I. FOREMAN, NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS FOR
NON-STATISTICIANS: A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH 2 (2009) (stating that most researchers choose sample
sizers at least as large as thirty); Alan Agresti & Yongyi Min, On Sample Size Guidelines for Teaching
Inference About the Binomial Parameter in Introductory Statistics 1 (Aug. 15, 2002) (unpublished
manuscript), http://www.stat.ufl.edu/~aa/articles/agresti_min_binomial.pdf (identifying the
similarity a population distribution obtains with a normal distribution when sample sizes are thirty or
greater as the reason for suggesting a sample size of thirty in the first place).
153. Scott, supra note 5, at 25.
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Finally, the most noteworthy objection is that the data on which the
studies relied is unreliable. A random spot check conducted by Federal
Defenders of the TRAC Reports revealed several inaccuracies, and TRAC
appears to have taken some of its data from documents that are compiled
for the purpose of budgetary requests, not sentencing research.154 To the
extent budgetary documents carry their own biases, the data may be less
reliable. What’s more, the Commission draws its data from paperwork
completed by courts, but judges do not always fill out those reports;
courtroom deputies or probation officers sometimes do.155 And there are
often multiple ways for a person filling out the paperwork to represent
the same sentencing factor. Despite these difficulties, nobody has yet
introduced a better proposal for measuring inter-judge disparity. And the
Commission and Congress consider the data good enough for the
Commission to satisfy its duty to research and report on sentencing
patterns.156 Moreover, as explained in greater detail below, the proposal
in this Article does not depend on the precision of the data. Rather, the
proposal uses the data to shift the focus of judges’ onto the sentencing
patterns of other judges on the same court.157 Even if the data suffers
from reliability issues, it is still sufficient to create this paradigm-shifting
function because the benefit of this Article’s proposal is intended to be
felt more in the aggregate than on the individual level.
Although good reasons exist to be skeptical of these studies, the
studies’ consistent findings coupled with the knowledge that Booker took
away the greatest weapon under the Sentencing Reform Act against
inter-judge disparity make it easy to conclude with high confidence that
inter-judge disparity has become more problematic in the post-Booker
world. It is not an understatement to say that the weight of scholarly
authority strongly favors the notion that Booker has caused an increase
in inter-judge disparity.
II. A PROPOSAL FOR PRESUMED UNREASONABLENESS
The weight of the evidence above shows that inter-judge disparity
has increased and will likely grow worse as newer judges who never
sentenced under the mandatory Guidelines take the bench. But a return
to a mandatory regime158 would pursue a reduction in inter-judge
154. Sentencing Res. Counsel Project, Fed. Pub. Defs., TRAC’s Report Claiming “Surprising
Judge-to-Judge Variation” Fails to Compare Similar Cases, Relies on Poor Quality Data, Uses an
Unreliable Method of Identifying Case Type, Uses Incorrect Methods of Reporting Sentence Length,
and Contains Numerous Errors, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 20, 25–26 (2012).
155. Nancy Gertner, Judge Identifiers, TRAC, and a Perfect World, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 46, 47 (2012).
156. 28 U.S.C. §§ 995(a)(12), (14)-(16) (2012).
157. See Part II; Part III.A.3.
158. Congress could constitutionally return to a mandatory regime by adopting, through statute,
the remedy proposed by the main Booker dissent: providing for mandatory Guidelines only when the
facts necessary to a sentence are either admitted to by the defendant or found beyond a reasonable
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disparity at the expense of creating unwarranted uniformity. After the
mandatory Guidelines era, there is little reason to suggest that sentencing
can be pressed into a rigorous, scientific system that places a quantifiable
weight on every single relevant sentencing factor.
Instead, reducing inter-judge disparity must be pursued through
indirect means that have ancillary effects on sentencing behavior. The
problem that caused an increase in inter-judge disparity was not Booker
alone; it was the subsequent reduction of any meaningful system of
appellate review. Increasing appellate review is the logical reform, but
the details are elusive. Notably, increasing appellate review raises some
constitutional issues. A system of appellate review that is (1) tied to the
Guidelines and (2) so constraining as to make the Guidelines system de
facto mandatory likely violates the Sixth Amendment as construed by the
Court since Booker.159
It follows that an effective form of stricter appellate review should
be independent of the Guidelines. But to adequately reduce inter-judge
disparity, the appellate review system must also induce judges to provide
greater justifications for their sentences and make judges more aware of
their own sentencing tendencies in relation to the sentences their peers
impose. Simply knowing how a judge’s peers sentence should have an
anchoring effect on most judges,160 and creating a rebuttable
presumption of unreasonableness should induce judges to engage more
critically with the distinctions between each specific sentence, an effect
that would itself reduce inter-judge disparity.
This reform could be achieved under existing law, which requires
judges to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted disparities among”
similarly situated offenders.161 But because the Supreme Court has
layered onto appellate review an abuse-of-discretion standard,162
rendering appellate review effectively toothless, and because the record
in a given case rarely includes evidence of what sentences similarly
situated offenders received, the best chance for achieving this reform lies
in a statutory amendment. Congress should require appellate courts to
presume that a sentence is unreasonable if the sentence falls too far from
the median sentence similarly situated offenders receive. (Part IV
explores the methodology the Commission should adopt in defining
categories of similarly situated offenders.) This statute could be added to
18 U.S.C. § 3742 to establish the following:
doubt by a jury.
159. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47 (2007) (prohibiting a presumption of
unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines).
160. See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 113, at 1128 (establishing that study participants’
estimates of the percentage of African countries in the United Nations were strongly influenced by
what number arbitrarily appeared in a game of chance before they made their estimates).
161. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2016).
162. Gall, 552 U.S. at 41.
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Presumption of Unreasonableness: A court of appeals shall presume
a sentence is unreasonable when it departs too far from the median
sentence for like offenders. This presumption can be rebutted if the court
of appeals finds that the sentencing judge’s explanation is sufficiently
compelling.
The Sentencing Commission shall have the authority to define categories
of like offenders and determine how far a sentence may vary before being
presumed unreasonable.163

Congress could itself determine exactly how to define categories of
like offenders, but it is likely the specific details may be crime-dependent
and that the Sentencing Commission, as the institution with greater
expertise in this matter, is in a better position to tailor specific formulas
to specific crimes.
The benefits of the proposal are explored in detail in Part III. Briefly,
this reform would accomplish two important things: it would avoid
constitutional problems by creating an appellate system wholly outside
the Guidelines (but which uses data created by the Guidelines system),
and it would create a system that has indirect ameliorating effects on
inter-judge disparity. By allowing judges to overcome the presumption of
unreasonableness, this reform would create a system where judges would
be required to include more detailed and comprehensive explanations for
their sentences. Although the § 3553(a) factors already require judges to
avoid unwarranted disparities among similarly situated offenders,164 this
proposal would require even greater justification when a judge decides to
sentence an offender too far from the median.
This Article suggests that courts presume that a sentence is
unreasonable when the sentence falls within the bottom or top fifteen
percent of sentences that similarly situated offenders receive. (An
exception might be made when the difference between the bottom and
top fifteen percent is, in absolute numbers, small. Inter-judge disparity
carries comparatively less harm in those situations.) This number is
exclusive: A sentence length would not be presumed unreasonable for
falling in the ninetieth percentile if the same length also fell within the
eighty-fourth percentile. The fifteen-percent figure is chosen for
illustrative purposes. The figure might be too blunt to rectify inter-judge
disparity across the board, or a more robust statistical metric, such as
163. Congress would also need to amend 28 U.S.C. § 994, which concerns the powers of the
Commission, to read as follows:
The Sentencing Commission shall promulgate and distribute methods for defining
categories of offenders who are similarly situated to the instant defendant. In doing so, the
Commission shall detail which of the Commission’s individual offender database variables
shall be used, how many years of sentencing data should be included in the sample, what
the minimum sample size of similarly situated defendants should be, how to treat
Guidelines amendments, and any other factors that would be appropriate to implement the
appellate system of review spelled out in 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
164. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2016).
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median absolute deviation, might be more appropriate.165 This Article
uses the fifteen-percent figure merely for illustrative purposes.
A few safeguards may also be established to avoid placing too much
focus on this reform at the expense of the guidelines and to avoid
drowning the already voluminous dockets of many courts. This proposal
affords no official place for sentencing data at the initial sentencing
decision, so this proposal should not increase litigation costs at that
stage. And the proposal can avoid excessive appealsfederal appellate
courts already receive more than 3000 procedural reasonableness
challenges each year166by making appeal permissive only. Defendants
will not be permitted to appeal unless they are granted something similar
to a certificate of appealability in the habeas context by a neutral federal
authority whose job it is to review each sentence and notify those
defendants who are eligible to appeal. Part IV shows that calculating
whether a sentence is presumptively unreasonable should take very little
time. Permissive appeal is appropriate because the system of appellate
review proposed in this Article is designed to affect inter-judge disparity
at the aggregate level. Appeals are the vehicle the proposal uses to obtain
a shift in the sentencing conversation, encourage judges to be more
thorough in their sentencing habits, and indirectly inform judges about
the sentencing habits of their peers in ways that will mitigate the effects
of inter-judge disparity on all offenders.
III. THE BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSAL
A. DISTINCTIONS FROM EXISTING PROPOSALS
Before outlining in detail the merits of this proposal and defending
its constitutionality, it is worth exploring how this proposal differs from
other suggested proposals and avoids some of the weaknesses that affect
those proposals.
1.

Systematic Reforms

Some reforms suggested shortly after the Supreme Court decided
Booker are now foreclosed by precedent,167 but others remain. The
165. Using the median absolute deviationwhich measures the statistical dispersion centered
around the median instead of the meaninstead of the standard deviation, would likely be more
appropriate because this more robust statistical measure better protects against the influence of
outlier sentences. The sentencing data does not fall into a normal distribution, where the mean and
median would be the same, because of a number of factors: The Guidelines exercise a large anchoring
effect on judges, and there is a strong inclination among judges to sentence at the bottom of a
calculated range when judges do not depart. Supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. Sentencing
data does not come close to resembling a normal distribution, so the median is a more appropriate
tool of analysis because it diminishes the significance of outlier sentences such as life sentences.
166. 2013 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 107, at tbl.59; 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 107, at tbl.59.
167. Several individuals, including Professor Frank Bowman and then-Attorney General Alberto
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Constitution Project Sentencing Initiative, which included then-Judge
Alito, proposed that the Guidelines effectively be re-written. The
sentencing ranges would be wider; the adjustments would be found by a
jury (or admitted to by the offender); and judges would enjoy more
permissive departures than under the Guidelines.168 Judge William
Sessions, who served on the Commission from 1999–2010, proposed a
similar reform.169 Sessions believed advisory Guidelines “are by
definition unenforceable and thus allow for the emergence of sentencing
disparities that motivated many American sentencing reforms in the first
instance.”170 He pushed for a binding approach with “sub-ranges” within
the wider ranges; the wider ranges would be mandatory, and judges
would use the presence or absence of aggravating factors to sentence
within sub-ranges.171 Departures “would need to be based on truly
extraordinary mitigating circumstances” and would be subject to
“relatively strict” appellate review; appellate courts would review the
sufficiency of the evidence for whether mandatory aggravating factors
were proved to a jury.172
Judge William Pryor, who currently serves as Acting Chair of the
U.S. Sentencing Commission, recently proposed a reform similar to the
reform Sessions proposed. Like Sessions’s reform, Pryor’s would be
much simpler than the current Guidelines and would include broad,
effectively binding ranges, which he calls “presumptive.”173 “[O]nly the
most important and common aggravating and mitigating factors” would
remain for calculating a guidelines range, and a jury would have to find
those factors.174 The more complicated and sui generis aggravators and
mitigators would be moved to the commentary section of the Guidelines

Gonzalez, proposed “topless guidelines” where judges would be bound by the minimum calculated
guideline ranges but would have advisory maximum ranges. Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker:
Advisory Guidelines in the Federal System, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 341, 356–64 (2006). This form of
guidelines is, under current doctrine, undoubtedly unconstitutional. See Alleyne v. United States, 133
S. Ct. 2151, 2162–63 (2013) (requiring any factor that increases the mandatory minimum of a crime to
be proved before a jury).
168. CONSTITUTION PROJECT SENTENCING INITIATIVE, Recommendations for Federal Criminal
Sentencing in a Post-Booker World, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 310, 314–17 (2006); see also Bowman, supra
note 96, at 364 (summarizing the plan).
169. Sessions III, supra note 17, at 337–53. Bowman endorsed both Sessions’ and the Constitution
Project Sentencing Initiative’s proposals. Bowman, supra note 96, at 364.
170. Sessions III, supra note 17, at 339 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Kevin R. Reitz,
The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional Law at Cross-Purposes, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 1082, 1114 (2005)).
171. Sessions III, supra note 17, at 347.
172. Sessions III, supra note 17, at 351, 354.
173. William H. Pryor, Jr., Returning to Marvin Frankel’s First Principles in Federal Sentencing,
29 FED. SENT’G REP. 95, 98 (2017).
174. Id.
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and would affect only where within a “presumptive” guideline range a
judge decided to sentence a defendant.175
The Commission has proposed several reforms. First, it asked for a
statutory change that would require judges to abide by a “three-step”
process: judges would first calculate the Guidelines, consider the
Commission’s commentary and policy statementswhich are strongly
oriented toward preventing departuresand finally consider the
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors.176 Second, the Commission asked Congress
to codify its policy statements that currently conflict with congressional
statutory policy. Congress requires the Commission to “assure the
guidelines . . . reflect the general inappropriateness of considering the
education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and
responsibilities, and community ties of the defendant.”177 But Congress
also requires judges to consider the “history and characteristics of the
defendant,”178 which has created a “tension” between statutory law and
the provisions in the Guidelines that instruct judges to ignore certain
offender characteristics.179 Finally, and most importantly, the
Commission asked Congress to create a presumption of reasonableness
for within-Guideline sentences, require proportionally “greater
justification[s]” when sentences are further outside the guideline range
(abrogating Gall), and require appellate courts to apply a heightened
standard of review when district courts disagree with the Commission’s
policy statements.180
The American Bar Association’s proposal adopts the position taken
by the main Booker dissent, which argued that the correct remedy in
Booker was to require the government to prove aggravating elements to
juries.181 But because presenting to a jury every single relevant element
of an offense is procedurally unmanageable, the ABA proposes that the
Guidelines be greatly simplified to reduce the number of adjustments,

175. Id.
176. Uncertain Justice: The Status of Federal Sentencing and the U.S. Sentencing Commission
Six Years After U.S. v. Booker: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 55–60 (2011) (statement of Judge Patti
B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sent’g Comm’n), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/
congressional-testimony-and-reports/testimony/20111012_Saris_Testimony.pdf.
177. 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (2012). The Commission has adopted this policy. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H, introductory cmt. (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
178. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2016).
179. Uncertain Justice, supra note 176, at 57; see also Improving the Advisory Guideline System
Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n app. question 4 (Feb. 16, 2012) (statement of
Henry Bemporad, Fed. Pub. Def., W. Dist. of Tex.), https://www.fd.org/sites/default/files/
criminal_defense_topics/essential_topics/sentencing_resources/defender_recommendations/bem
porad_statement_2_16_12.pdf (requesting that Congress codify the Commission’s policy statements
that education, family ties, etc., are “not ordinarily relevant”).
180. Uncertain Justice, supra note 176, at 55–56.
181. Berman, supra note 167, at 365.
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offense levels, and other complex factors.182 Under this proposal, a
prosecutor who sought to obtain a higher sentence for a robbery would
have to allege in an indictment, “in addition to the elements of robbery,
whether the defendant possessed a firearm, whether he brandished or
discharged it, [or] whether he threatened death,” among other things.183
A separate proposal calls not for a new set of guidelines but instead
a reformulation of what it means for a judge or jury to make fact findings.
Douglas Berman and Stephanos Bibas argue that a distinction exists
between facts about the offender and facts about the offense.184
According to Berman and Bibas, juries have historically discerned
offense facts and should continue to do so, but courts are better equipped
to discern offender facts. The implication of the distinction is that a
legislature might establish guidelines that bind judges based on facts
judges discern that relate to the offender, not to the offense.
Whatever merits or demerits these proposals have on other grounds,
they are poorly suited to attacking inter-judge disparity. The proposals
offered by Sessions, and the Commission re-create the Guidelines in
much of their complex rigor. Amy Baron-Evans and Professor Kate Stith
characterize the Commission’s proposal as one meant to “undo the
holdings of the Supreme Court in Booker and its progeny and to
reestablish the Commission’s guidelines and policy statements as the
‘law’ of sentencing.”185 Pryor’s and the ABA’s are much simpler, but they
too lack the ability to attack inter-judge disparity head-on. To the extent
any of these proposals will increase uniformity, they will have an
incidental and marginal effect on inter-judge disparity as well, but the
wide ranges that would be established under these proposals suggest that
inter-judge disparity would remain high. At the price of avoiding
unwarranted uniformitya noteworthy goalthese proposals are
unable to fully address inter-judge disparity.
Some of these proposals also operate on constitutionally tenuous
grounds under the current doctrine of the Supreme Court. The Court has
exercised tremendous influence in the area of reasonableness review
under the Guidelines, and it is not necessarily clear that a stricter system
would not draw out the Sixth Amendment issue Booker tried to put away.
Several scholars argue that Booker and its progeny create a delicate
balance between judicial discretion and uniformity, a balance that can be
easily upset.186 Baron-Evans and Stith have directly declared Sessions’
182. Am. Bar Ass’n, Crim. J. Sec., Report on Booker and Recommendation, 17 FED. SENT’G REP.
335, 339 (2005).
183. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 254 (2005).
184. Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J CRIM. L. 37,
38 (2006).
185. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 24, at 1731.
186. Hessick, supra note 24, at 1336, 1348 (“[T]here is little doubt that this recommendation would
shift the delicate balance the Court has struck after Booker away from district court discretion towards
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and the Commission’s proposals unconstitutional.187 And the
Commission’s proposal to require appellate courts to presume that
within-Guidelines sentences are reasonable directly contradicts Rita’s
holding that such presumptions be permitted out of a “desire to avoid
creating a bias for within-Guidelines sentences.”188 The Commission’s
proposal creates that bias. It and other proposals may very well be
constitutional, but a rigorous assessment of constitutionality is required,
and the proposals largely lack constitutional analysis.
2. Calls for Stronger Appellate Review
Arguably, “Booker left unclear exactly how loose appellate review
must be to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.”189 Some scholars maintain that
Congress should require appellate courts to apply a sufficiency-of-theevidence
standard
to
judicial
fact-finding.190
Additionally,
then-Professor Stephanos Bibas argues that Congress should create
sentencing courts, prohibit defendants from waiving their rights to
appeal, and require political diversity on appellate panels.191 Professor
Crystal S. Yang argues for courts to require a “heightened justification for
more severe departures.”192
These scholars are generally on the right track. The problem with
the post-Booker system is the same as the main problem that afflicted
indeterminate sentencing: the system lacks meaningful appellate review.
But these scholars call for greater appellate review without fleshing out
what the systems would look like or defending the constitutionality of the
systems, which is critical because Booker struck down stronger appellate
review and other scholars have identified constitutional problems with
increasing appellate review.193 Bibas, for example, readily acknowledges
that precedent bars the sufficiency-of-evidence proposal.194
Furthermore, none of these proposals are well-tailored toward reducing
inter-judge disparity. Yang limits her form of appellate review to
sentences outside guideline ranges, which would prevent her form of
the Guidelines.”); Hessick & Hessick, supra note 99, at 3–4 (describing the balance as increasing
judicial discretion to avoid the Sixth Amendment problem, but creating some appellate review to
pursue uniformity).
187. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 24, at 1716–31 (arguing that Booker requires any Guidelines
system to be advisory).
188. Hessick, supra note 24, at 1347.
189. Bibas et al., supra note 113, at 1372–73.
190. Bibas et al., supra note 113; O’Hear, supra note 113, at 752 (arguing that courts should create
an “explanation review”).
191. Bibas et al., supra note 184, at 1373.
192. Yang, supra note 107, at 1333.
193. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 24, at 1731.
194. Bibas et al., supra note 113, at 1396 (“[T]he Court’s jurisprudence is deeply misguided.
Binding guidelines and searching appellate review are needed to make sentencing more consistent and
legitimate.”).
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review from considering inter-judge disparity that occurs within
guideline ranges.
3. Trailing Edge Guidelines and Statistical Curving
Professor Mark Osler describes uniformity and discretion as
historically antagonistic to each other. To solve this problem, he suggests
that the government create a computer system through which judges
enter specific sentencing data to see what sentences similarly-situated
offenders received. This notably would achieve some of the same goals as
this systemnamely, making judges more aware of the sentences issued
by other judges. Osler also suggests that appellate courts apply a
heightened standard of review when sentences stray too far from
sentences of those other judges.195
In Osler’s system, however, the common sentencing practices of
judges would become the Guidelines, and the Commission’s role would
be limited to defining mitigating or aggravating circumstances without
placing numerical offense levels on those circumstances.196 Although
Osler’s proposal has some appeal because the Commission claims to have
created the Guidelines in the first place based on historical sentencing
practice,197 the proposal in this Article pursues a different tactic in
response to information derived from a review of the sentencing data.
Foremost, this Article’s proposal permits a greater degree of
forward-looking modifications to the Guidelines. Osler’s model seeks to
institute a method that would provide feedback regarding sentencing
practices,198 but it also risks entrenching past practices by ensuring that
previous sentences have a strong gravitational effect on future sentences.
This Article’s proposal leaves more room for the Commission to amend
the Guidelines in numerical ways, such as the Commission did when it
reduced the drug quantity table by two levels.199
Second, this Article’s proposal more strongly adheres to the ability
of the Guidelines to act as an anchor. Osler’s proposal seeks to be more
transformational, but by prohibiting the Commission from attaching
numerical offense levels to aggravating and mitigating factors,200 Osler’s

195. Mark Osler, The Promise of Trailing-Edge Sentencing Guidelines to Resolve the Conflict
between Uniformity and Judicial Discretion, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 203, 207, 234 (2012).
196. Id. at 230, 243.
197. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL CH. 1(A)(1)(3) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015) (noting
that the Commission started with an “empirical approach that used as a starting point data estimating
pre-guidelines sentencing practice”).
198. Osler, supra note 195, at 230.
199. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 29-36 (April 30,
2014),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/reader-friendly-amend
ments/20140430_RF_Amendments.pdf (displaying a two-level reduction from previous years in the
base offense level assigned to various drug quantities).
200. Osler, supra note 195, at 229.
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model would make it difficult for judges to compare aggravating and
mitigating factors with each other because the computer system would
show only the end sentence, not how a judge arrived at it. For instance,
the current Guidelines dictate that a defendant’s intent to promote
terrorism should be weighed six times as heavily as physically restraining
a victim,201 and it is twice as mitigating when an offender is a “minimal”
participant than when he is a “minor” participant.202 This Article’s
proposal retains this useful information.
Finally, this Article’s proposal expands on some of the limits of
Osler’s model by synchronizing the basic idea of computer-generated,
data-driven sentencing with the actual data itselfsomething that was
beyond the scope of Osler’s initial article. It turns out that the data, while
enormous, is not robust enough to apply Osler’s model. As laid out in Part
IV, below, the Commission’s data files show that, as the number of
compared factors increases, the sample sizes rapidly decrease. The
dataset is too small for a meaningful analysis of sentencing patterns when
the set is filtered by more than a few data points. Osler suggests that
judges could input the specific offense characteristics associated with a
crime into the computer.203 But the data shows that this method would
shrink the population sample beyond usefulness. For instance, the
Guidelines category for basic forms of fraud (section 2B1.1) includes
nineteen specific offense characteristics. The presence or absence of
these offense characteristics is not random, but assuming for the sake of
illustration that each characteristic is equally likely, only 1 in 524,288
offenders under section 2B1.1 would exactly match any other
defendant204 before general enhancements are even factored in. Only
about 70,000 defendants are convicted each year for all Guidelines
categories, much less for section 2B1.1. Of course, the presence of offense
characteristics is not random, but even if including all those variables
would sometimes produce a sufficiently large sample size, including
more than a few variables risks overcomplicating the system enough to
render it ineffective. A more complicated system would be less likely to
be well-received and would increase the risk of error.
Another scholar recently published a proposal that bears some
similarity to Osler’s and to the proposal in this Article. Adi Leibovitch
remarks that specialized courts and courts of varying geographic
jurisdictions exhibit different sentencing patterns. She argues that those
201. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 3A1.3, 3A1.4 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
202. Id. at § 3B1.2.
203. Osler, supra note 195, at 233 (including as one of the factors to be considered in the search
for similarly situated offenders the fact that an offender robbed a bank).
204. Assuming that each characteristic is equally likely to be absent as it is likely to be present, the
probability that two offenders would exactly match the distribution of nineteen different variables is
1
1
.
19 =
2

524,288
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patterns arise because judges sentence offenders based on how
blameworthy an offender is in relation to other offenders a judge sees.205
Judges who sentence only relatively low-level offenders tend to sentence
those offenders more harshly than do courts of general jurisdiction.206
Leibovitch argues that courts should use computers to review the
distributions of sentences from other courts and employ “statistical
curving” to ensure that sentences correlate with those issued in other
jurisdictions.207
Leibovitch’s article, like Osler’s, suggests that past sentences should
effectively become the guidelines judges use to sentence offenders. This
backward-looking proposal is distinct from a proposal that seeks to
employ sentencing data at the appellate stage. By introducing data into
the equation at the sentencing stage instead of only the appellate stage,
Leibovitch’s proposal runs the same risk as Osler’s: that previous
sentencing practices will anchor judges, causing defense attorneys and
prosecutors to fight over that data. For that reason, Leibovitch’s proposal
would similarly risk freezing current sentencing in place. Although
district court judges could look at sentencing data as part of the proposal
in this Articleindeed, they can do that alreadythis Article’s proposal
makes review of sentencing data an official part of sentencing policy only
at the appellate stage, so it avoids much of the risk of freezing and ensures
that the Sentencing Commission can make policy changes. Although
Leibovitch mentions that appellate courts could review sentencing
information and press more weight against sentences that deviate
significantly from mine-run sentences,208 establishing the contours of
what that appellate system would look like is beyond the scope of her
article. This Article, in contrast, develops a methodology in Part IV and
identifies that the abuse-of-discretion standard is significantly
responsible for the increase in inter-judge disparity.
B. THE PROPOSAL IS SOUND POLICY
To date, nobody has proposed a reform that accomplishes what the
proposal outlined in this Article would. Indeed, only Osler’s and
Leibovitch’s come close to targeting inter-judge disparity, which was a
central aim of the Sentencing Reform Act and continues to frame debates
on sentencing today.209 Following Booker, the Guidelines fall short of

205. Adi Leibovitch, Punishing on a Curve, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1205, 1224–33 (2017).
206. Id. at 1207.
207. Id. at 1256, 1261.
208. Id.
209. Hofer, supra note 8, at 39. But cf. Judge Nancy Gertner, How to Talk About Sentencing
Policyand Not Disparity, 46 LOY. C. CHI. L.J. 313 (2014) (remarking that disparity is “far, far less
important than issues of sentencing fairness, of proportionality, of what works to address crime” and
that rampant sentencing disparity is a myth).
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reducing inter-judge disparity, although they are not completely
dissociated from these goals to the extent they anchor judges.
This proposal addresses inter-judge disparity without repeating the
error the Act made when it drastically reduced judicial discretion. Before
the Act, broad judicial discretion had been universal, rarely challenged,
and explicitly upheld by the Supreme Court.210 Congress attempted to
reduce inter-judge disparity by significantly reducing discretion, but the
problem was not in discretion alone; it was in the absence of meaningful
appellate review. When Congress did increase appellate review, it did so
only to enforce the mandatory nature of the Guidelines.211
As the studies explored above have now indirectly demonstrated,
this lax appellate standard has proven ineffectual. Booker implemented
an unusual form of appellate court review and then gutted its central
aspects to afford district court judges extremely broad discretion.212
Those appellate forms of review that remain are impotent. District courts
can disregard Guidelines policies;213 substantive reasonableness
challenges are almost never successful;214 and procedural reasonableness
review is relatively unchallenging.215
As opposed to the proposals that seek a fundamental transformation
of the Guidelines system, this proposal instead creates a system that
supplements the Guidelines, makes judges more aware of the sentences
issued by their peers without formally introducing the use of sentencing
data at the initial stage of sentencing, and induces judges to provide
greater justifications for their sentences. Judges already must
“adequately explain the chosen sentence”216 in a way that is at least
somewhat proportional to the amount of departure from a guideline
range.217 But the Court’s doctrine makes “adequate” mean hardly more
than “minimal”218 and does little to reduce inter-judge disparity. This
reform increases the floor for what constitutes an “adequate” explanation
for offenders who receive sentences that deviate from the norm.
210. See supra Part I.A.
211. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2006).
212. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 99, at 3, 14.
213. See supra notes 102–104 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 107.
215. See supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2012)
(requiring sentencing judges to include a statement of reasons when sentencing an offender).
217. The holding in Rita requires sentencing judges to “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate
court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own
legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). The judge will
“normally go further and explain why he has rejected” arguments to depart from the Guidelines, and
“[w]here the judge imposes a sentence outside the Guidelines, the judge will explain why he has done
so.” Id. at 357. It is also “uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a more
significant justification than a minor one” and that a judge must “adequately explain the chosen
sentence.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007).
218. See supra Part I.B.

DIVINE-69.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

806

4/6/2018 4:00 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:771

For example, in addition to requiring higher justifications for
sentences in general, this proposal also requires higher justifications for
inter-judge disparity that occurs within guideline ranges. In doing so, this
proposal far exceeds anything the Court or Congress has required.
Present doctrine assumes away any concern for this form of disparity; the
Court has held that no explanation beyond relying on the Guidelines’
internal reasoning will generally be warranted for these sentences.219
Congress has also failed to recognize the existence of this form of
disparity. The statute that covers appellate reversal for failure to provide
a statement of reasons permits vacating a sentence only when the
sentence lies outside the calculated guideline range.220 Yet most judges
sentence at the bottom of a calculated range,221 causing disparity
whenever a judge sentences elsewhere within the range. This form of
disparity is particularly harmful because judges who sentence within a
guideline range can rest easy knowing they will almost certainly be
affirmed.222
This proposal gives greater effect to the Court’s nominal
requirement that judges adequately explain their sentences. Booker
implied the standard of reasonableness review from the Sentencing
Reform Act (after excising the provisions that made the Guidelines
mandatory).223 This proposal asks Congress to revamp that standard to
put more pressure onto sentencing judges to adequately explain their
sentences. As laid out below, increasing the burden on sentencing judges
to adequately justify their sentences will have both ameliorative effects
on inter-judge disparity and other incidental benefits that reduce general
disparity.
1. Effect on Judges
The proposal in this Article would carry several benefits. Most
notably, it would shift the conversation in sentencing by inducing judges
to provide greater justifications for their sentences. This proposal
permits district court judges to rebut the presumption of
unreasonableness by creating a more robust explanation for why the
defendant merits the sentence issued. The practice of including greater
written justifications, even if unaccompanied by significant differences
in sentencing behavior or reversal rates, would rectify at least some
219. Rita, 551 U.S. at 356–57.
220. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f) (2012). The only exceptions are when the sentence is otherwise unlawful,
is incorrectly implied, or where the offense has no applicable guideline range, limiting an appellate
court to remand only if the sentence “is plainly unreasonable.” Id. The presence of these exceptions
has been criticized as violating Booker. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 307 n.6 (2005) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
221. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
222. Gertner, supra note 209, at 319.
223. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261.
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inter-judge disparity because it would create a written record that would
establish that an offender is not similarly situated to other offenders.
What’s more, this proposalincluding, as it does, a presumption of
unreasonablenesswould almost certainly increase the reversal rate.
Judges who were at all risk averse and who doubted that they might be
able to craft a sufficiently compelling justification for a sentence would
likely moderate that sentence. And this proposal carries little risk that the
gravitation of sentences will be so moderating that sentences become de
facto uniform because this proposal largely targets harsher and more
lenient judges.
A second and related major benefit of this proposal is the increased
awareness judges would obtain of the sentencing practices of their peers.
Many judges are largely unaware of sentences issued by other judges on
the same court,224 and rarely does information about the sentencing
practices of other judges appear in the record. But under this proposal,
outlier judges who do not already know that their sentencing practices
deviate will quickly learn as much. And unlike Osler’s and Leibovitch’s
proposals, which run the risk of placing too much focus on the sentences
other judges issue, this proposal reaps the benefits of introducing
sentencing data into the system without drawing too much focus away
from the Guidelines. It does so by formally introducing sentencing data
only at the appellate stage. Some sentencing judges may, of course,
consult the sentencing data on their ownand judges are more likely to
do so if they can decrease their chances of being reversedbut nothing
suggests that consultation will shift the focus of sentencing from the
Guidelines to sentencing data. Under current doctrine, judges will still be
required to calculate guideline ranges, but nothing will require judges to
consult the sentencing data.
The incidental effect this proposal would have on increasing judicial
awareness of peer practices would also assist those judges with satisfying
an obligation they already are required to meet but that is difficult to
meet. When sentencing, judges must consider “the need to avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records
who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”225 In the light of the
numerous studies that establish that inter-judge disparity has increased
significantly over the last decade, it is clear this provision has minimal
practical effect. One reason is that the sentences of similarly situated
offenders are rarely in the record. The proposal in this Article, by
increasing judicial awareness of other sentences, partly rectifies this
problem.
Another benefit of this proposal is that it tackles inter-judge
disparity indirectly. The indirectness of the proposal carries some
224. Kopf, supra note 2, at 50.
225. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2012).
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downsides: it bestows the benefit of enhanced appellate review only on
those who receive the harshest and most lenient sentences even though
inter-judge disparity also affects people who receive mine-run sentences.
But the indirectness of this proposal is precisely why it should be
effective. The proposal is geared toward aggregate, not individual,
change. The Sentencing Reform Act employed a heavy-handed approach
to try to directly eliminate inter-judge disparity. That approach created a
host of other problems. But when judges provide greater justifications for
their sentences, their actions will mitigate inter-judge disparity for all
offenders. In targeting harsher and more lenient sentences, this proposal
will disproportionately affect harsher and more lenient judges. These
judges will either find themselves reversed with great frequencywhich
will convey important information to these judgesor will be deterred in
a way that will cause them to give more attention to justifying their
sentences.
Judges
who
were
initially
unaware
ofor
underestimatedtheir harsher or more lenient tendencies will
moderate.
For similar reasons, this proposal will also attack one area of
inter-judge disparity scholars have so far neglected to address: reducing
inter-judge disparity within guideline ranges. Although appellate courts
are not permitted to presume that sentences issued outside guideline
ranges are unreasonable, they are permitted to presume that sentences
within guideline ranges are reasonable.226 “[T]he presumption reflects
the fact that . . . both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing
Commission will have reached the same conclusion as to the proper
sentence in the particular case. That double determination significantly
increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable one.”227 This
presumption ordinarily makes it difficult to challenge inter-judge
disparity that falls within a guideline range. No other scholar has yet
proposed a solution that attacks within-range inter-judge disparity. This
proposal does just that by removing the presumption of reasonableness
for sentences that fall toward the tail ends of the distributions, regardless
of whether those sentences fall within or outside of the guideline ranges.
Finally, this proposal would target the particular risks of inter-judge
disparity associated with judges who have taken senior status. Because
judges on senior status are able to tailor their dockets,228 they are less
likely to encounter a representative cross-section of cases. As Leibovitch
has established, judges who sit on specialized courts tend to craft the
severity of sentences in relation to the rest of their dockets, not in relation
226. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007).
227. Id.
228. 28 U.S.C. § 294(c) (2012) (requiring judges who have taken senior status to take on only as
much work as they are “willing and able to undertake”). District courts can adopt more concrete
regulations.
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to all possible crimes.229 Because judges on senior status can exclude
certain kinds of cases from their dockets, the same effect extends to them.
This proposal mitigates that effect.
2. Minimal Effect on Anchoring
The difficult task of an institution that crafts a sentencing regime
that includes guidelines is discovering how to strike a balance between
uniformity and individual treatment.230 The mandatory Guidelines
focused too much on narrow uniformity. The advisory Guidelines
technically permit a sentencing judge to issue whatever sentence she
wishes, subject only to the constraint that the judge consider the
guidelines and that the judge not issue a substantively unreasonable
sentence. But the evidence establishes that, in practice, the Guidelines
have a similar anchoring effect on judges across the country.231 This effect
remains one of the strongest tools that prohibit inter-judge disparity
from growing even worse, and this proposal does little to diminish that
anchoring effect because it affords official use of sentencing data only at
the appellate stage. By additionally limiting this system to individuals
who have received a certificate of appealability,232 this system will help
ensure that the Guidelines maintain their current locus in federal
sentencing policy. Instead of undermining the focus on the Guidelines, a
risk entailed by other proposals that have suggested that judges reference
sentencing data, this proposal chips away at the excesses of individual
treatment that the advisory Guidelines produce.
3. Effect on Non-Judicial Sources of Disparity
This reform not only brings federal sentencing practice more in line
with the central purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act; it also carries
ancillary benefits. It is well established that judges are responsible for
relatively little sentencing disparity compared to prosecutors.233 But

229. Leibovitch, supra note 205.
230. Barkow, supra note 97, at 1619.
231. Barkow, supra note 97, at 1621.
232. See supra Part II.
233. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 6 (2011) (identifying the
shift in power from judges and juries to prosecutors as one of the key reasons for current criminal
justice problems); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 4, at 101–02 (finding that, pre-Booker,
statutes and Guidelines accounted for 73% of sentencing disparity, with judges accounting only for
2.9% of sentencing disparity); Anderson et al., supra note 9, at 301 (detailing the significant impact
regional prosecution policies through U.S. Attorney’s Offices have on inter-district sentencing
disparity); Bunin, supra note 19, at 81 (identifying prosecutors as the greatest source of disparity;
Hofer, supra note 8, at 39 (identifying mandatory minimums, prosecutor decisions, and plea
bargaining decisions as more significant sources of disparity); cf. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at
130 (noting that prosecutors have gained greater relative control over sentencing than before the
Sentencing Reform Act).
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reducing inter-judge disparity has collateral effects on prosecutor-driven
disparity.
Prosecutors have numerous avenues to create disparity. In
determining what charges to bring and whether to stipulate certain facts,
prosecutors have a comparatively larger role in framing an offender’s
record in relation to the actual offense. Prosecutor stipulations have
increased since Booker, as have prosecutors’ demands that offenders
who enter pleas waive their rights to appeal.234 And prosecutors pursue
mandatory minimums at disparate rates. None of the eligible defendants
in some districts were charged with mandatory minimums, but
prosecutors in other districts charged three-quarters of eligible
defendants with mandatory minimums.235 Prosecutors also control
whether motions for sentencing enhancements or reductions are
filedthey have the sole authority to file § 851 enhancement motions of
information, which double an offender’s mandatory minimum
sentenceand the vast majority of departures for substantial assistance
are prosecutor-driven.236
The sources of prosecutor-driven disparity are voluminous, and a
tailored reform like the one presented in this Article can address only
some of them. Although judges are often randomly assigned to cases,
prosecutors often are not,237 which means prosecutors can tailor their
conduct based on the judge who is assigned a case. It is this source of
disparity that the reform presented in this Article can mitigate. For
instance, prosecutors can tailor charges to a judge because they can often
file a superseding indictment after a judge has been assigned.238 And
because prosecutors are repeat players, they have the incentive to tailor
their conduct to help ensure that future interactions are beneficial.239 But
when a judge’s sentencing decisions are constrained not by the force of
guideline ranges but by the need to construct a compelling explanation
justifying a significant deviance from the median sentence, prosecutors
will have proportionally less influence on these judges.
This proposal also can rectify some racial disparity in sentencing.
Although researchers disagree on the existence or extent of racial
disparities in sentencing and whether those disparities are caused by
234. Ulmer & Light, supra note 11, at 338.
235. Yang, supra note 112, at 1323–24.
236. Although a judge can grant a departure for substantial assistance without a motion of the
government, judges rarely do. Section 5K1.1 motions for substantial assistance from the government
were recognized in 9482 cases last year. 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 107, at tbl.30 n.1. But judges
recognized substantial assistance without a government motion in just over 400 cases. 2014
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 107, at tbl.25, tbl.25A, tbl.25B. Prosecutors can also file for substantial
assistance motions to reduce a sentence after an offender has been sentenced. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(B).
237. Hofer, supra note 8, at 41.
238. Yang, supra note 112, at 1278 n.43.
239. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (arguing that
cooperation can arise from self-interested motives alone).
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sentencing decisions instead of the decisions made at the investigation or
adjudication stages,240 the Sentencing Commission has released a report
that finds a substantial increase in racial sentencing disparity after
Booker.241 And the Acting Chair of the Commission recently reported that
black male defendants are twenty-five percent less likely than white male
defendants to receive downward variances sua sponte.242 To the extent
some racial disparities arise from sentencing decisions instead of earlier
decisionssuch as charging decisionsthis Article’s proposal
ameliorates some of that racial disparity by narrowing the overall gap and
incidentally the racial gap.
4. Further Positive Effects
Tying the identities of judges to their sentencing habits has proved
controversial. Opinions vary on whether judges need identity protection
given their Article III protection,243 but this reform benefits from not
requiring the disclosure of judicial identities, which may be a dealbreaker
for some actors.
Additionally, recognizing that inter-judge disparity is a relatively
small part of the disparity equation, this proposal avoids aggravating
those other sources of disparity. The same cannot be said of some other
proposals. For instance, because some proposals increase prosecutorial
powerlike the ABA proposalthey risk making disparity worse.244
This proposal could also spark the development of a common law of
sentencing in federal courts. Because the doctrine of sentencing review
promulgated after Booker has been so deferential, precedent includes
almost no guidance as to what “reasonable” means in the context of
reasonableness review.245 The precise contours of what appellate review
would look like does not lend itself to a ready explanation ex ante.
Appellate review would instead be fleshed out through litigation in
fact-specific scenarios. To the extent more sentences were reversed, the
proposal in this Article would “creat[e] the building blocks of a common
law of federal sentencing” that would define what is meant by a
240. Scott, supra note 4, at 716–18.
241. Scott, supra note 4, at 717.
242. Judge William Pryor, Remarks at Scalia Law School 7–8 (May 17, 2017),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/speeches-and-articles/20170517_Pryor-Remarks.pdf.
243. Compare, e.g., Scott, supra note 5, at 22 (arguing that the Commission’s policy of refusing to
publicly disclose judge identifiers is rooted in a desire for judges to shield themselves from criticism–“an
astonishing expectation for public officials who enjoy life tenure”), with Mosi Secret, Wide Sentencing
Disparity Found Among U.S. Judges, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/03/06/nyregion/wide-sentencing-disparity-found-among-us-judges.html (identifying Justice
Rehnquist as worrying “that collecting data on judges’ sentencing practices ‘could amount to an
unwarranted and ill-considered effort to intimidate individual judges.’”).
244. Yang, supra note 112, at 1279.
245. See Laura I. Appleman, Toward a Common Law of Sentencing: Gall, Kimbrough, and the
Search for Reasonableness, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 3, 3–4 (2008).
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“reasonable” sentence.246 By requiring sentencing judges to increase the
level of explanation for sentences that fall outside the mine-run, and by
reviewing those explanations, a more robust common law of sentencing
might begin to emerge.
5. The Limits of the Proposal
Not every subpart of a system must be oriented toward the system’s
overall goals. This proposal is limited to ameliorating inter-judge
disparity, and it does so in a way that avoids impinging on the gains that
Booker made247 while attacking the inter-judge disparity that Booker
introduced.
Because this proposal uses the appeals of individual sentences as a
vehicle to enact broader, aggregate change, the proposal incurs some
inequities. The proposal bestows the main ameliorative effects on all, but
some individuals receive the additional, direct benefit of having access to
a new appellate tool, and still others bear the burden of having to defend
their lenient sentences. This inequity is small because this reform should
largely lead to a shift in the sentencing conversationit will encourage
judges to issue greater justificationsnot a dramatic increase in
overturned sentences. The remaining inequities are acceptable because
they enable the pursuit of broadly shared benefits that might be
unobtainable without either this proposal or a much more severe
proposal like mandatory guidelines.
This proposal is also limited because of its reliance on data the
Commission collects. This data largely comes from a Statement of
Reasons form judges are supposed to submit to the Commission within
30 days of sentencing an offender.248 When information is left off the
form or is otherwise unavailable, the Commission pulls data from the
Pre-Sentencing Reports probation officers compile to relay facts about
the offense and the offender and to assist the judge at sentencing.249 This
protocol can introduce inconsistencies.
Former-Judge Nancy Gertner has declared the entire data set
worthless for measuring inter-judge disparity. She argues the forms are

246. Id. at 3 (“A sentencing common law was something originally envisioned by the U.S.
Sentencing Commission.”).
247. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 24, at 1682–1703; see also Bunin, supra note 19, at 82–83
(identifying judicial discretion as preventing more disparity than it causes in part because the
Guidelines fail to take into account some mitigating factors).
248. 28 U.S.C. § 994(w) (2012).
249. To the extent possible, information is first taken from the Statement of Reasons. In addition
to a few other forms, the Presentence Investigation Report prepared by the probation officers under
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 is used to fill gaps in the data obtained by the Statement of Reasons. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, VARIABLE CODEBOOK FOR INDIVIDUAL DEFENDERS 2 (2015),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/researchandpublications/datafiles/Individual_Codeb
ook_FY99_FY14.pdf.
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too “simplistic” and were designed only to help the Commission “monitor
Guideline enforcement, principally departures.” She also contends that
courtroom deputies or probation officers, not judges, routinely complete
the forms.250
To be sure, the sentencing data betrays inaccuracies and shows that
not all individuals who submit data do so in a uniform manner. For
example, the vast majority of judges who find no applicable mandatory
minimum on the statutory form appropriately report the “statutory
minimum” on the Statement of Reasons as “0.” But out of the more than
10,000 drug trafficking cases in 2014 where the judge reported no
applicable mandatory minimum, the data for more than 800 offenders
inexplicably listed a non-zero value for the variable that shows a
“statutory minimum.”251 The data for one offender showed he was subject
to a statutory minimum of life but included a contradictory variable that
indicated that “no count of conviction carries a mandatory sentence.”
Despite this, another variable stated that a “mandatory minimum
sentence [was] imposed.” Additionally, the data for 229 offenders
exhibits that no counts of conviction carried a mandatory sentence, but
the data also exposes that the judges somehow departed from mandatory
minimum sentences.252
Despite these errors, Gertner’s analysis may be overstated. Her
criticisms derive from her experience on a court that may be
unrepresentative of national practice. Further, data inaccuracies are
inherent in any reasonably substantial dataset, and the Commission
takes measures to mitigate data inaccuracy. Biannually, all data is
compared with the sentencing data file held by the Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts to ensure accuracy, and sentences that fall outside a
guideline range are reviewed by hand.253
But even accepting all of Gertner’s criticism, the data remains the
best source for defining categories of similarly situated offenders, and the
Commission uses this data for its congressionally authorized research

250. Gertner, supra note 155, at 47.
251. This Article controls for the following factors to obtain this figure: the offender was sentenced
under section 2D1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the judge issued a non-zero value for
the variable that shows whether the offender was convicted under a statute bearing a statutory
minimum, and a contradictory separate variable was present that signaled that “no count of conviction
carries a mandatory sentence.”
252. This Article controls for the following factors to obtain this figure: the offender was sentenced
under section 2D1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the judge issued a zero value for the
variable that shows whether the offender was convicted under a statute bearing a statutory minimum,
and a contradictory separate variable was present that signaled that “one or more counts of conviction
carry mandatory [minimums] but the court determined it does not apply.”
253. Lou Reedt et al., Effective Use of Federal Sentencing Data, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 9 (2013),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/datafiles/20131122-ACSPresentation.pdf.
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purposes.254 The shortcomings are relatively rare in a scheme where
more than 70,000 offenders are sentenced each year. Especially
considering that high precision is not necessary for this proposal, data
that is good enough for the Commission ought to be good enough for this
proposal, even if it is less than ideal.
That leaves the practical limits of this appeal. As with any system
that calls for new forms of information to be presented to judges, some
logistical issues arise as to how data will be made accessible. But those
issues are almost entirely administrative in nature, and computer
accessibility places this specific reform within reach in a way not true in
earlier decades. As explained in detail in Part IV, calculating whether a
sentence should be presumed unreasonable is straightforward and would
require no work from judges if administrative officials within the courts
calculated sentences.
C. THE PROPOSAL IS CONSTITUTIONAL
The critical weakness in many of the proposals considered above is
that there are good arguments that the proposals are unconstitutional
and that none of the proposals sets out to defend itself on constitutional
grounds.255 The constitutional concerns are two-fold. First, the Court
may have crafted a delicate balance: the Court promoted judicial
discretion to avoid the Sixth Amendment issue but also instituted a
gutted form of appellate review to promote some uniformity.256 If, as
some say, this balance is refined and delicate, then reducing judicial
discretion to issue a non-Guidelines sentence might be constitutionally
problematic.257 The second point of concern is that a constraint, even if
not tied to the Guidelines, might still render an indirect effect on the
Guidelines that makes them de facto mandatory.
If a proposal reduces a judge’s discretion and ability to avoid a
non-Guidelines sentence (the first point of concern), that proposal must
wade through the Booker progeny. The case friendliest toward altering
the forms of appellate review is Booker itself. In drawing up a remedy,
the Booker majoritywhich included Justice Breyer, an architect of the
original Guidelines from his days on the First Circuit258explicitly
sought to divine “what ‘Congress would have intended’ in light of the
Court’s constitutional holding.”259 From Congress’s decision to orient the
Sentencing Reform Act toward promoting uniformity, the Court found
254. 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(12), (14)–(16) (2012).
255. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 24, at 1716–41.
256. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 99, at 3–4, 14.
257. Hessick, supra note 24, at 1348; see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47 (2007)
(prohibiting a presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines).
258. Linda Greenhouse, Guidelines on Sentencing Are Flawed, Justice Says, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 1998),
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/21/us/guidelines-on-sentencing-are-flawed-justice-says.html.
259. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005).
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that Congress had implied a reasonableness review.260 The Court made
its view clear when it declared, “Ours . . . is not the last word: The ball
now lies in Congress’s court.”261 These statements indicate that Congress
has at least some flexibility to alter the Court’s reasonableness standard
or to abolish review for abuse of discretion, and the Court’s later cases
are essentially interpretations of the “reasonableness review” it found
Congress had created by statute.
But the majority of movement has occurred on the bench, not in
Congress. In Gall, the Court prohibited courts from adopting “rigid”
mathematical rules that required sentencing judges to justify their
sentences in proportion to the degree of departure. Doing so, according
to the Court, would come “too close to creating an impermissible
presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the [g]uideline
range.”262 The Court also prohibited a heightened standard of review for
sentences lying outside the guideline range.263 But unlike in Booker, the
Court dropped its deferential language, making it unclear how much of
the holding was constitutionally necessary and how much was just a
common law exposition on the reasonableness review the Court created
in Booker. In Rita, the Court held that courts of appeals could presume
that sentences were reasonable if the sentences fell within guidelines
ranges.264 Because the presumption was non-binding, the Court rejected
the Petitioner’s argument that “plac[ing] an additional burden on the
district court to justify non-Guidelines sentences” is impermissible.265
The statement in Booker that “[t]he ball now lies in Congress’s
court” strongly suggests that all holdings about reasonableness review
that follow Booker are not required by the Constitution. At least one
Justice has expressly adopted the understanding that reasonableness
review amounts to nothing more than common law reasoning. Justice
Thomas has repeatedly refused to join the rest of the Court’s more recent
pronouncements about reasonableness review on the basis that “the
Court’s decisions in this area are necessarily grounded in policy
considerations rather than law” because the Booker remedy “has no basis
in the statute.”266
Even if the Court’s doctrinal pronouncements are tied to the
Constitution, the proposal in this Article does not impinge that doctrine.
The doctrine permits presumptions if the presumptions do not bind
judges to the Guidelines (Rita) but not if a sufficient risk exists that the
260. Id. at 260, 263.
261. Id. at 265.
262. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47 (2007).
263. Id. at 50–51.
264. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007).
265. Brief for the Petitioner at 33, Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (No. 06-5754).
266. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 114 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting); accord, e.g.,
Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 518 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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presumptions will (Gall). More importantly, the Court seems to care
tremendously about whether an appellate standard creates presumptions
that depend on whether the sentence is inside or outside the guideline
range. In Rita, the presumption applied only because the sentence fell
within a guideline range, and in Gall, an appellate court applied a rigid
proportionality justification and a heightened form of review because it
determined that the sentence was outside the guideline range. The Court
refused to permit that holding.
The proposal in this Article does not impinge on this doctrine
because it does not tie itself to the Guidelines. Under this proposal,
judges would not consider whether a sentence falls inside or outside a
guideline range. And given the common, but not universal, practice of
judges to sentence at the bottom of guideline ranges, this proposal would
implicate sentences both inside and outside the guideline ranges.
Although this Article uses data derived from sentences under the
Guidelines, it does so only to define categories of similarly situated
offenders, not to directly demarcate the boundaries between
unreasonable and reasonable sentences, as occurred in Gall.
This proposal also overcomes the second constitutional concern:
whether the reform indirectly makes the Guidelines de facto mandatory.
Admittedly, this proposal draws some parallels to the de novo form of
review the Court excised in Booker, but those parallels are shallow.
Before it was excised, § 3742(e) explicitly directed an appellate court to
review whether a sentence departed from a guideline range in a way not
authorized by the Guidelines.267 But for this proposal, whether a sentence
is inside or outside a guideline range is immaterial. And although any
form of stricter appellate review constrains judges somewhat, Congress
is constitutionally capable of increasing constraints on judicial
discretion. Congress, could, for example leave judges with no room for
discretion by tying specific, determinate sentences to every possible
offense.
Under this Article’s proposal, the effective range in which judges
could sentence would narrow, but the proposal would not introduce the
core Sixth Amendment problem underlying Booker, which was that
courts were required to issue certain sentences based on facts not found
by the jury. Indeed, the whole scheme of reasonableness review
(especially substantive reasonableness) expressly permits decreasing
judicial discretion based on judicial fact-findings. When a court of
appeals finds that a district judge’s sentence was substantively
unreasonable, the court holds that the facts the judge found bounded the
possible sentences the judge could issue. Even if the Court has carefully
crafted within reasonableness review a balance between discretion and

267. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)(B) (2012).
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uniformity, Booker states that Congress could supplant reasonableness
review altogether. The Court’s holding in Ritathat a presumption of
reasonableness is not unconstitutional in part because it is not
bindingis instructive here. While this Article’s proposal constrains
judges, it does so only to the extent it requires greater attention to
explanations of sentences. It does not bind judges to the guideline
ranges.268
The strongest argument against this proposal is that any reduction
in the range of sentences a judge can impose is unconstitutionalthat is,
a court can review sentences only for procedural reasonableness. While
some scholars support this position,269 the Court rejected this argument
7-2 when Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas) asserted it,270 and the
position has failed to gain traction since. What’s more, the proposal in
this Article arguably functions not as a substantive constraint, but as a
valid procedural constraint. Some lower courts might construe this
constraint as substantive,271 but the Court’s holding in Gall explicitly
describes as “procedural error” a judge’s “failing to adequately explain
the chosen sentence.”272 Boiled down, this Article’s proposal merely asks
Congress to require more explanation for outlier sentencesthat is, this
proposal seeks to alter the goal posts for what is “adequate.”
IV. METHODOLOGY FOR DEFINING CATEGORIES OF
SIMILARLY SITUATED OFFENDERS
This part establishes a methodology the Commission could use to
define categories of similarly situated offenders, and by wading through
the variables the Commission uses to code the data, it shows that enough
of the right kind of data exists to meaningfully create these categories.
This proposal operates as a new appellate structure outside the
Guidelines, but it depends on data drawn from a Guidelines-centered
system. Fortunately, the Commission’s trove of sentencing data provides
a ready opportunity to create these categories. Within thirty days of
sentencing an offender, judges must provide detailed sentencing data to

268. Other scholars have argued that the Court has created a balance between discretion and
uniformity and that a proposal is unconstitutional when it “shift[s] the delicate balance the Court has
struck after Booker away from district court discretion towards the Guidelines.” Hessick, supra note 24,
at 1343, 1348. Hessick identifies in the jurisprudence a uniformity ideal. But this uniformity ideal is
derived from the Sentencing Reform Act, not the Constitution. By adopting the proposal from this Article,
Congress would slightly shift its ideals away from those expressed in the Sentencing Reform Act.
269. E.g., Sarah M. R. Cravens, Judging Discretion: Contexts for Understanding the Role of
Judgment, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947, 966 & n.73 (2010).
270. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 370 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (arguing that no substantive component to reasonableness review can exist and that “district
courts must be able . . . to sentence to the maximum of the statutory range”).
271. See United States v. Borho, 485 F.3d 904, 911 (6th Cir. 2007).
272. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
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the Commission.273 Data files of individual and corporate sentences since
2002 are publicly available.274 The compliance rate is also good. Courts
gave the Commission every Judgment and Conviction order and 98.8%
of the Statement of Reason forms in 2014.275 Courts are required to use
these forms to record the reasons they issued a specific sentence,276 and
these forms are the primary documents the Commission uses to code
sentencing data. Although courts were somewhat less compliant with
providing Pre-Sentence Reports (handing over about ninety-two
percent), the Commission collects those reports largely to fill data gaps
in the Statement of Reason forms.
Even where researchers have discerned judges’ identities, the
studies often suffer from an inability to control for case characteristics
that affect sentencing.277 This Article’s method benefits from not needing
judge identifiers, and it allows for control of case characteristics because
it uses the Commission’s data, which includes thousands of data points
for each individual offender. Among other things, the data includes the
Guidelines code representing the statute of conviction (for example,
section 2D1.1 for drug trafficking), the presence or absence of the
numerous factors that go into calculating a guideline range, the circuit
and courthouse of the sentencing proceedings, and 264 possible reasons
a district court judge can give for departing from a guideline range.278
Although the data set is based on Guidelines that are themselves an
inexact tool for classifying like offenses, no better data set exists, and the
size of this set allows one to tailor the variable choices to diminish the
internal biases in the Guidelines. For instance, the Guidelines arguably
place too much emphasis on drug quantity, skewing the comparison
between drug and non-drug cases. But the data points allow one to avoid
that bias by isolating drug offenders from other offenders.
A. LIMITING THE PROPOSAL TO SPECIFIC OFFENSE CATEGORIES
Measuring inter-judge disparity is already difficult; it is made
practically impossible if researchers take steps that decimate population
sample sizes. The more variable qualifiers used to define a category of
similarly situated offenders, the smaller the sample size becomes. The
proposal accordingly should be used only for appeals of offenses that are
common enough to draw a decent sample size: notably drug, firearm, and
273. 28 U.S.C. § 994(w) (2012).
274. Commission Datafiles, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/research-andpublications/commission-datafiles.
275. 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 107, at tbl.1.
276. 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(1)(B) (2012).
277. See supra note 125.
278. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 249, at A-11–A-16; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, VARIABLE
CODEBOOK
(2014),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/
datafiles/Organizational_Codebook_FY00_FY14.pdf.
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white-collar cases, which comprise about fifty-six percent of the federal
criminal docket.279 Although immigration offenses make up a large part
of the federal docket (twenty-nine percent in fiscal year 2015280), those
offenses are excluded because, despite their number, the offenses create
comparatively little opportunity for inter-judge disparity. Congress’s
authorization of nationwide fast-track sentencingsignificant
downward departures given to some immigration offenders who enter
guilty pleashas significantly decreased judicial discretion.281 All
remaining offense categories constitute only about fifteen percent of the
federal docket. Not enough people commit these crimes to create
sufficiently large population samples against which an individual’s
offense can be measured. That the proposal in this Article is inapplicable
to certain offenses does not dampen the promise of the proposal. This
proposal does not seek an all-or-nothing revolution to make all sentences
just; it instead adopts the ideal that sentencing some defendants in a
more just manner is better than nothing. This proposal, moreover, works
in part by making judges more aware of sentencing patterns within their
districts. To that extent, this reform should have positive effects on the
entire criminal system.
B. SAMPLE SIZE
Certain offense categories are excluded because of sample size
issues, but even offenses that are included must not be considered if no
sufficient sample size of like offenders exists. The Commission can tailor
the sample size to specific offenses or even to specific districts. For
instance, the Commission might allow a smaller sample size in districts
that have historically suffered worse inter-judge disparity. But a sample
size of twenty-five similarly situated offenders should ordinarily be
sufficient. This sample size ensures that some measure of sentencing
pattern can be drawn in a district. A larger sample size would risk
eliminating many smaller districts from consideration. Even this sample
size eliminates some districtsalthough the opportunity for inter-judge
disparity in those districts is comparatively smaller.
The sample should be taken from the previous three years of
offenders for which data is available. This compromises between a need
279. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2015 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics fig.A (2016)
https://www.ussc.gov/research/sourcebook-2015.
280. Id.
281. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21 § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (The Commission
shall promulgate “a policy statement authorizing a downward departure of not more than 4 levels if
the Government files a motion for such departure pursuant to an early disposition program authorized
by the Attorney General and the United States Attorney.”); Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy
Attorney Gen., to all United States Attorneys 2 (Jan. 31, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/dag/legacy/2012/01/31/fast-track-program.pdf (permitting fast-track sentencing in all
districts).
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to reach a sufficient sample size and the recognition both that sentencing
patterns are dynamically tied to changes in judges, Guidelines, and
statutory law and that permitting too much of a backward-bias makes it
harder to induce future sentencing changes. Additionally, this
compromise recognizes that the choice of year introduces complexities;
Guidelines amendments ordinarily take effect on November 1 instead of
at the beginning of a regular calendar year.282 Where major amendments
have been added to the Guidelines, the Commission can make exceptions
or create a formula by which offenders in previous years can be compared
to current offenders.283
C. CHOICE OF FACTORS
The strength of this proposal lies not only in the more-abstract call
for more stringent appellate review, but also in the ability to view the data
and establish that the data could be used to define categories of similarly
situated offenders. For that purpose, this Subpart outlines suggested
factors the Commission could use to craft those categories. But the
proposal does not depend on the acceptance or rejection of each of these
suggested factors. This Subpart suggests each factor largely for
prudential reasons. This Article defines categories of similarly situated
offenders as those offenders in the past three available years who have
the following identical characteristics:284

282. A possible way around this problem would be to include the variables that detail the
sentencing date, but even that solution is imperfect. The sentencing date does not necessarily detail
the offense date, and defense litigation often focuses on which Guidelines Manual applies. Traveling
down this rabbit hole risks drowning the usefulness of this proposal in complexity. This proposal
strikes a balance between pragmatic simplicity and the precision that comes from considering more
variables.
283. For example, after the changes to the drug quantity tables took place on November 1, 2014,
many drug offenders became eligible for adjusted sentences based on guideline ranges two levels
below what the same offenders previously received. In comparing current offenders to earlier
offenders, the Commission could keep the analysis the samethat is, modern offenders would be
compared with those receiving the same guideline ranges pre-2014 but who had lower drug quantities.
But if there is good evidence, for example, that judges across the board found the drug penalties too
harsh and that the drug quantity table was reduced to reflect current sentencing patterns, not a policy
change, then it will be appropriate to compare modern offenders with earlier offenders who had higher
guideline ranges.
284. For a list of the Commission’s variables that correlate with these traits, see infra Appendix.
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 District of sentencing
 Guideline section dictating which category of offense conduct
was used to sentence the offender285
 Applicable guideline range in months, reflecting
adjustments minus acceptance of responsibility

all

 Criminal history score
 Acceptance or nonacceptance of responsibility; and
 Application or nonapplication of a mandatory minimum.
Because this reform is premised on shifting the location of the
conversation, stricter precisionwhich would require a greater number
of variablesis unnecessary. Indeed, including more variables would
complicate the calculations and decimate sample sizes.
1. Factors Included
Of the six factors stated above, five require little explanation. Their
relevance is easy to see. For instance, the Guidelines offense category
ensures that appellate courts compare offenders who have similar
criminal conduct, and the variable for acceptance of responsibility
ensures that offenders with similar culpabilities are compared.
(Acceptance of responsibility is not included in the variable for the
calculated guideline range.) The researchers in the study about the
Southern District of California lumped offenders into the same category
if they committed drug trafficking crimes, were subject to mandatory
minimums, and had received the benefits of the safety valve (thus
ensuring that they had the same criminal history).286 This Article adopts
a similar comparison but also considers acceptance of responsibility and
narrows the population samples to offenders who have the same
calculated guideline ranges.287
Limiting consideration of data to the specific district of sentencing
requires greater explanation. This reform is oriented toward the narrow
purpose of reducing inter-judge disparity, not transforming the entire
sentencing system. The ideal variable regarding geography should
therefore be tailored as much as practicable to include sentences issued
by any judge who could ordinarily sentence the specific offender. It is
285. This variable is admittedly imperfect because the conduct of some offenders requires
calculating multiple different Guidelines sections and choosing the highest calculation. Thus, the
conduct of offenders with the same calculation might diverge more than might be immediately
apparent.
286. Mason & Bjerk, supra note 125, at 191.
287. This proposal does lose some information used in the California Study. The existence of a
safety valve does not merely clue a judge into the criminal history of an offender; it also signals to the
judge whether the offense was violent and the offender’s relative role in the offense, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(f)factors this proposal considers only indirectly.
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only with respect to those judges that an individual can experience
inter-judge disparity because judges ordinarily cannot sentence
offenders outside the district in which an offense was committed.288
Descriptive and practical reasons favor limiting geography by
district and not further narrowing the scope to specific courthouses.
First, offenders in some districts can be randomly assigned to any
courthouse within a district.289 Second, using a variable covering the
entire district helps ensure that a sufficiently large population sample can
be drawn. Finally, the location of a crime within a district is sometimes
as arbitrary as the assigning of an individual offender to a specific judge.
It makes some difference, but not much, that a police officer might find
drugs during a routine traffic stop close to the ultimate delivery location
in, say, Hartford, Connecticut, than merely in route in New Haven or
Bridgeport. This criticism is, of course, applicable where somebody is
apprehended in New York for an eventual delivery to Bridgeport, but
interstate travelbecause it requires intrastate travelis necessarily less
common.
One could increase the population sample sizes for categories of
similarly situated offenders by considering, in the alternative, all
offenders across all districts. But that consideration is better tailored
toward reducing inter-district disparity, which does not necessarily
reduce inter-judge disparity. For instance, the disparity between two
districts can be zero even if judges within each district diverge from other
judges on the same court. Because this Article seeks to reduce inter-judge
disparity, limiting review district-by-district is more appropriate for this
proposal.
Furthermore, some inter-district disparity is healthy to a sentencing
regime, even if the Sentencing Reform Act has rejected that value,
whereas no affirmative direct benefit to inter-judge disparity exists. For
instance, Guidelines-identical firearms crimes do not have the same level
of harm when committed in rural Wyoming than in Manhattan, and it is
understandable that two judges might sentence those offenders
differently. It is precisely because not all statutorily identical crimes are
equal that the Guidelines prescribes ranges in the first place, yet most
judges ignore the purpose of those ranges by almost always sentencing at
the low end of the guideline range. Moreover, even if the harm of a crime
is identical in different districts, the harm to different localities of
288. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(C)(3)(D). One notable exception to this rule is the opportunity for judges
who have taken senior status to sit by designation in other districts. 28 U.S.C. § 294(d) (2012). But
while those judges may bring their sentencing practices and biases from their home districts, their
sentences should be compared with other in-district sentences.
289. D. CONN. L. R. CRIM. P. 50 (2009) (requiring only that cases be assigned “in accordance with
a general policy . . . in the interest of the effective administration of justice”). The District of Minnesota
also has assigned cases “without regard to the division in which the case arose.” D. MINN. ORDER FOR
ASSIGNMENT OF CASES 7 (Dec. 1, 2008).
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incarceration changes between districts. The incidental harms of
incarceration are arguably worse in areas where the incarceration rate is
already high, and federal law has underappreciated that phenomenon in
its haste to make a federal case of many issues that used to fall within the
sole province of the states.290 Pursuing too vigorously an ideal of interdistrict uniformity also removes one of the largest checks on the severity
of the federal system and undermines state policy.291
2. Factors Excluded
Here, too, this Article’s choice reflects a compromise between
precision and practicality. The drug quantity table often dictates the
same offense level for two offenders who have wildly varying drug
quantities (for example, fifteen kilograms of cocaine versus
forty-nine),292 but judges may reasonably sentence such Guidelinesidentical offenders differently. One could further narrow the categories
of similarly situated offenders by controlling drug quantities more
precisely, but this line-by-line comparison of every factor the
Commission collects would do nothing more than to reveal that each
crime is uniquea useless exercise when trying to determine which
offenders are similar.
That comparison would ensure that an appropriate sample size
never arose. So, too, would an approach that considered every
enhancement or reduction. For example, the offense category for theft
and embezzlement includes nineteen specific offense characteristics,293
and requiring offenders to match each of those factors would rapidly
diminish the population sample.
Instead, this proposal recognizes that the internal logic of the
Guidelines asserts that offenders are similarly situated based on the
calculated guideline ranges alone. Because this reform, at its core,
accepts the Guidelines logic, Congress could more feasibly adopt this
proposal because it departs less from current policy. The conversion of
these variables into a common currency is admittedly a legal fiction. In
reality, the Guidelines place inordinate weight on certain
factorsnotably drug quantity and loss amount.294 But a lot of these
290. See, e.g., Michael M. O’Hear, National Uniformity/Local Uniformity: Reconsidering the Use
of Departures to Reduce Federal-State Sentencing Disparities, 87 IOWA L. REV. 721, 723 (2002).
291. Id. at 753–65 (arguing that courts have too readily pursued an ideal of national uniformity at
the expense of an ideal of local uniformity, which is equally valid under federal law).
292. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(C) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).
293. Id. at § 2B1.1(b).
294. For economic crimes, the Guidelines have the potential to place far more weight on the
economic loss of a crime than for an offender’s relative role in the offense. In United States v. Adelson,
441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), the court rejected the government’s request for a Guidelines
life sentence. Noting that the practically inevitable decline in stock prices that follows from the
revelation of fraud can have a tremendously large loss impact when that decline happens across
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biases are contained to specific sentencing categories (such as drug
quantity). To get rid of these biases, this Article does not fully accept the
assertion of the Guidelines that any two offenders with the same
calculated range are similar. It instead accepts that assertion only when
two offenders committed the same statutory offense. This Article further
limits the sample with five other elements, which mitigates the internal
biases of the Guidelines.
A precise comparison between offenders also is not needed for a
proposal that reduces inter-judge disparity. By making certain sentences
subject to unreasonableness presumptions, this proposal will induce
judges to include greater justifications for their sentences and to become
more familiar with the sentencing practices of other judges on the same
court. By nature, determining who is a victim or beneficiary of
inter-judge disparity is difficult because no baseline “correct” sentence
exists from which to measure a departure. But the strength of this
proposal is that it will ameliorate sentences in general by increasing
awareness of district-wide sentencing practices.
The methodology for this proposal omits other variables in part
because even the Guidelines contain no method for comparing those
variables. One such area is the hundreds of reasons judges may choose
for departing from a guideline range, none of which are quantified and
millions of shares, the court stated that the loss table “may lead to guidelines offense levels that are,
quite literally, off the chart” and are “patently absurd.” Id. at 509, 515.
The loss table is located at section 2B1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, but in a sense
of rigid display, the Guidelines apply the loss table to a host of rather diverse crimes, and it is far from
obvious that a loss amount in one crime applies to an equivalent fiscal loss amount in another. For
instance, the loss table comes into play for the “volume of commerce attributable” to a defendant
broadcasting obscene material, section 2G3.2, or merely transporting it, section 2G3.1. But it also
applies to insider trading gains, section 2B1.4, and the destruction of fish, other wildlife, and plants,
section 2Q2.1. Furthermore, it is not even clear that loss amount is an appropriate measure to begin
with. Embezzlement of one million dollars that destroys a small company and puts thirty people
completely out of work may be more devastating than a loss ten times as high that is spread loosely
among ten million passive investors. Also controversial is how a loss is calculated in the first place.
Some courts have applied a market-capitalization measure of damages, looking at the average value
decrease per share multiplied by the number of shares. Cf. United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 542
(5th Cir. 2005) (reporting that the district court had sentenced according to the loss in stock price to
a shareholder, without regard to any other factor that might affect stock price). This method of loss
calculation is overly simplistic; it does not take into account the price at which shares were purchased
or the multitude of factors that affect share price. Two-thirds of the loss in Olis occurred either before
or more than a week after the problems were revealed. Id. at 548. Because market capitalization can
drive a sentence, some have called for a separate guideline for those offenses. The Reform of Federal
Sentencing for Economic Crimes, AM. BAR ASS’N. CRIMINAL JUSTICE TASK FORCE 9 (Nov. 10, 2014),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice/economic_crimes.au
thcheckdam.pdf. The Commission recently amended the Guidelines to help ameliorate this problem.
Previously, the Guidelines required courts to presume that market capitalization loss provided a
reasonable estimate of the actual loss. Now, the Guidelines allow courts to use “any method that is
appropriate and practicable.” U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 25,
30 (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/official-textamendments/20150430_Amendments_0.pdf.
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many of which are inherently incomparable. One variable asks whether
a sentence “[a]fford[s] adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.”295 That
variable will mean two very different things for different
offendersespecially if “deterrence” can refer to specific deterrence, not
only general deterrence.
Finally, this Article groups together all offenders who received a
mandatory minimum sentence and, separately, all who do not, regardless
of the reason the court did not apply a mandatory minimum. This latter
choice respects that the Commission considers offenders who were never
subject to a mandatory minimum to be similarly situated to those who
were simply granted a reprieve.296
3. The Complexity of Guideline Amendments
One noticeable omission from this Article’s choice of factors is any
consideration of recent Guidelines amendments. Major amendments can
make comparing sentences of offenders over a course of years difficult.
This proposal begins at a base level of generality and calls for the
Commission to complicate the analysis only where necessary.
Considering amendments at the general stage risks overcomplicating this
reform. For one thing, fashioning a rule for all amendments would be
overbroad. For another, amendments ordinarily take effect on November
1 instead of at the beginning of a calendar year. If amendments were
taken into account, then additional variables (such as date of sentencing)
would need to be considered, further complicating this proposal.
Some amendments can be ignored altogether if the effect of the
amendments is minute, because offenders sentenced before and after the
amendment will often still be similar. But for other amendments, the
Commission should draft special policy statements that instruct judges
on how those judges should consider specific amendments.
V. CONCRETE EXAMPLES
Previous proposals, notably Mark Osler’s, have suggested inserting
the sentencing data into a computer-based algorithm to determine what
sentence should issue. But providing concrete examples was beyond the
295. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 249, at A-11.
296. This choice is a bit imperfect. The main reasons for departing from a mandatory
minimumsubstantial assistance and the safety valve—are not completely comparable. Congress has
stated that imposing a lower sentence than the mandatory minimum is “general[ly] appropriate[]”
when an offender has rendered substantial assistance. 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (2012). In contrast, a court
“shall impose” a non-mandatory minimum sentence if the offender is eligible for the safety valve.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). But Booker effectively nullified any distinction between “may” and “shall,”
diminishing the distinction between the two categories. The only real difference is that, with substantial
assistance, the government sometimes suggests a departure amount, and the judge sometimes obliges
because judges are supposed to consider “the government’s evaluation of the assistance rendered.” U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1(a)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).
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scope of those articles. The following examples demonstrate how the
proposal in this Article would work in practice.
A. DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
The three graphs below represent sentencing patterns in the District
of Massachusetts from 2011 to 2014. These charts represent, for three
guideline ranges, offenders sentenced in that district who were sentenced
under section 2D1.1 (drug trafficking), had criminal history scores of 1,
received a three-level sentence reduction due to acceptance of
responsibility, and did not receive a mandatory minimum sentence.
Figure 2: Guideline Range: 37-46 Months, D. Mass.
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Figure 3: Guideline Range: 46-57 Months, D. Mass.
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Frequency

Figure 4: Guideline Range: 87-108 Months, D. Mass.
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Consistent with earlier remarks on the topic, sentences tend to
aggregate toward the bottom boundary of a guideline range. In each of
these cases, not one offender received higher than the range
minimumindicating that there may be less inter-judge disparity within
guideline ranges in this district. However, some judges frequently
sentence elsewhere in a guideline range, meaning that an offender can
receive a noticeably harsher intra-guideline range sentence based
entirely on judicial identity. This further establishes the need to develop
a system that can wrestle with disparity that occurs within a calculated
guideline range.
Several spikes appear in each of these graphs. The spikes in both
Figure 2 and Figure 4 appear at the guideline range minimum, at 0
(representing a non-prison sentence), and in between. Additionally, no
discernible correlation exists between the mid-point spike and an
identifiable trend in downward departures or variances. One could
understand a mid-point spike if it correlated with a reduction in an
offense level, but the absence of a correlation with the bottom of a
guideline range suggests that some judges are issuing specific sentences
without discernible input from the pertinent guideline ranges. For
instance, the mid-point spike in Figure 3 is 24 months, but that number
does not represent a range minimum or maximum from the sentencing
table. Only the spike in Figure 2 correlates with an actual guideline range,
but it represents a six-point reduction in the calculated guideline range.
Guidelines policies, however, typically provide for a two- or three-point
reduction.
The graphs also demonstrate how this reform would work. Figure 2
includes no sentences that would be presumed unreasonable because the
lowest and highest sentence (0 and 37 months) reflect 19 of the 42
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sentences, meaning no category of sentence falls wholly within the
bottom or top fifteen percent of sentences. But in Figure 3, the court of
appeals would presume that the sentences of 0, 1, 2,297 41, or 46 months
were unreasonable. Sentencing judges could rebut these presumptions
by providing sufficiently compelling justifications, which themselves
would have ameliorating effects on the sentences given to other
offenders. For Figure 4, the court of appeals would presume that any
sentence of 0 months or 87 months was unreasonable.
B. WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
These charts represent, for four guideline ranges, offenders
sentenced in in the same three-year span in the Western District of
Missouri who were sentenced under section 2D1.1 (drug trafficking), had
criminal history scores of 1, received a three-level sentence reduction
because of acceptance of responsibility, and did not receive a mandatory
minimum sentence.
Figure 5: Guideline Minimum: 30 Months, W. D. Mo.
30

Frequency

25
20
15
10
5
0
0 2 4 6 8 101214161820222426283032343638404244
Sentence Length

297. To reduce the complexity of the horizontal axis, this Article organizes the data in bins. The
2-month bin includes all sentences greater than 0 months but less than or equal to two months.
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Figure 6: Guideline Minimum: 37 Months, W. D. Mo.
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Figure 7: Guideline Minimum: 46 Months, W. D. Mo.
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Figure 8:298 Guideline Minimum: 70 Months, W. D. Mo.
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In each of these four figures, one spike relates to the guideline range
minimum, and another relates to the minimum for a two-level reduction
from the applicable range minimum. Thus, unlike the data from the
District of Massachusetts, the data indicates that some judges apply a de
facto two-level reduction after calculating the guideline ranges, perhaps
under a belief that the Guidelines are two levels too harsh. And no
common variable is apparent among the offenders who received de facto
two-level reductions. Additionally, in each of Figures 5, 6 and 7 at least
one judge deviated from the norm that offenders should be sentenced at
the bottom of a range, indicating possible inter-judge disparity within the
guideline range.
It is easy to see how the proposal in this Article would play out in
these situations. The court of appeals would presume that the sentences
up to and including sixteen months in Figure 5 were unreasonable. The
same is true for the forty-three month sentence (but not the thirty month
sentences, as that sentencing bucket, although above the eighty-fifth
percentile, also includes percentages below the eighty-fifth percentile).
In Figure 6, the court of appeals would presume that everybody
sentenced to eighteen months or less, as well as the individual sentenced
to forty one months, received an unreasonable sentence. In Figure 7,
offenders sentenced to twenty-four months or less would have the
opportunity to appeal, as well as the offender sentenced to fifty-two

298. The sentences in the 58-month bin of Figure 8 (all sentences greater than 56 months but less
than or equal to 58 months) were all equal to 57 months, which represents the new range minimum
that would result if a judge were to apply a two-level reduction to the applicable range minimum.
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months and the offender sentenced to sixty months. The offenders
sentenced to forty-six months would not be able to appeal because that
bucket falls both above and below the eighty-fifth percentile. In Figure 8,
the sentences up to and including forty months would be presumed
unreasonable.
CONCLUSION
Studies consistently show a significant increase in inter-judge
disparity after Booker. While Booker removed many of the worst
qualities of the Sentencing Reform Act, it also removed the aspect of the
Act that most effectively reduced inter-judge disparity. Decisions of the
Supreme Court after Booker have gutted any meaningful appellate
review, which has left the federal sentencing system inept at curtailing
inter-judge disparity. This problem is likely to grow worse as newer
judgesless anchored to the Guidelines than those who sentenced under
the mandatory Guidelinesjoin the bench.
Scholars have floated many proposals to change the Guidelines, but
these proposals have been poorly tailored to reducing inter-judge
disparity. Some of the proposals also make the same mistakes the
Sentencing Reform Act did, and they have neglected to address
constitutional questions raised by their proposals. Instead, reducing
inter-judge disparity requires not a new set of Guidelines, but a
heightened form of appellate review, and the Commission’s data set
provides a prime opportunity for creating a form of review unimaginable
at the time Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act.
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APPENDIX
All data referenced in this Article is publicly available on the
Commission’s website.299 Courts are required to provide the Commission
with detailed data regarding a sentence within thirty days of that
sentence.300 The Commission then strips this data of identifying
information (for example, judge’s and offender’s identities, case number)
but still leaves up to thousands of different variables regarding the
sentences. The Commission derives this data from a number of sources,
including the Statement of Reason form, the Pre-Sentence Report (if
necessary), the Judgment and Conviction Order, and in some instances
the plea agreement.301
SPSS or SAS software can extract the information, although SAS
cannot extract all the variables, including potentially relevant factors
such as the offender’s age, sentencing date, the loss amount from a crime,
the date an offense of conviction began and ended, and (critically)
whether a non-incarceration sentence was issued.302
After extracting the data, appropriate sentencing characteristics
were isolated to find sentencing patterns:
 CIRCDIST: the district in which the offender was sentenced.
 GDLINEHI: the sentencing guideline, showing the section of
the Guidelines under which the offender’s highest range was
calculated.
 XCRHISSR: the criminal history score of the offender.
 GLMIN and GLMAX: the calculated guideline range,
including all chapter adjustments but excluding acceptance of
responsibility.
 STATMIN: the existence and amount of any applicable
mandatory minimum.
 ACCTRESP: the existence, and offense level reduction,
attributable to acceptance of responsibility.
 MAND_: whether a mandatory minimum was applicable and
was applied.
 SENTTOT0: The total monthly prison sentence, including
probation as “0” values.
 SENTMON & SENTYR: the month and year of sentencing.

299.
300.
301.
302.

U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 274.
28 U.S.C. § 994(w) (2012).
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 249, at 2.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 249, at 9, 29, 34, 41–42.
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 REAS_: The reason(s) given for a sentence imposed outside
the range.
 BOOKERCD: The generalized description (twelve possible
values) for whether a sentence fell outside the range and for
what generalized reason.303
After isolating the variables, the data was filtered into common
factors. Similarly situated offenders were defined as those who were
sentenced in the same district (“CIRCDIST”), under the same Guidelines
section (“GDLINEHI”), with the same criminal history calculation
(“XCRHISSR”), whose calculations fell within the same range
(“GLMIN”) and (“GLMAX”), who had the same status and applicable
offense level reduction for acceptance of responsibility (“ACCTRESP”),
and who either had a mandatory minimum applied or who did not
(“MAND_”).304 The remaining variables, for example (“REAS_”) were
used to discern whether the disparities and spikes in the sentencing data
were explainable by some other readily identifiable factor. For instance,
after discovering consistent twin spikes in Figures 5-8, the REAS_ factors
were reviewed, which come in almost 300 varieties,305 to make sure no
discernible pattern suggested that one or more factors contributed to
disparately spiked sentences. Although a judge could list dozens or even
hundreds of reasons for a departure, judges overwhelmingly issued
either no reason at all or just one.

303. The underscore (“_”) denotes a placeholder. For instance, an offender’s data can include hundreds
of possible reasons for a departure under the variable REAS_ (for example REAS1, REAS2, REAS3).
304. This variable was used in conjunction with the variable STATMIN. If an offender had a
mandatory minimum applied, relying on both these variables helps determine whether the sentence
was the mandatory minimum or whether a sentence above the mandatory minimum was applied.
305. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 249, at A-11–A-16.
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